{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2013-698/annex/division-1/division-1.1",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2013-698/annex/division-1/division-1.1.json",
  "legislation": "eudn/2013/698",
  "legislation_title": "Council Decision 2013/698/CFSP of 25 November 2013 in support of a global reporting mechanism on illicit small arms and light weapons and other illicit conventional weapons and ammunition to reduce the risk of their illicit trade",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2013-698",
  "path": "annex/division/1/division/1.1",
  "kind": "division",
  "number": "1.1",
  "heading": null,
  "text": "This Decision builds on successive Council Decisions to combat the destabilising impact of the diversion and trafficking of SALW and of other conventional weapons. The illicit proliferation of SALW and of other conventional weapons and ammunition is a major factor undermining State stability and exacerbating conflicts, which poses a serious threat to peace and security. As stated in the EU SALW Strategy, Africa remains the continent most affected by the impact of internal conflicts, which are aggravated by the destabilising influx of SALW. The sheer number of African peacekeeping operations and arms embargos clearly illustrates the scale of the threat posed to African States by the illicit accumulation and spread of SALW and other conventional weapons. Other regions of the world, including certain parts of Latin and Central America, Central and Eastern Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East are similarly affected by illicit SALW and other illicit conventional weapons proliferation.\nThe international community currently lacks vital monitoring and diagnostic capacity in the field of combating illicit SALW and other illicit conventional weapons proliferation. This stems from three linked factors. Firstly, most conventional weapons trafficking takes place via land and in conflict-affected regions where on-the-ground monitoring is scarce. Secondly, existing monitoring capacity is weakly connected with UN sanctions monitoring groups, peacekeeping missions and non-governmental organisations operating in relative isolation from one another, and the available information from them is fragmented. Thirdly, limited and uncoordinated monitoring fails to provide policy makers with the information necessary to formulate effective counter-proliferation policies.\nThis Decision aims to provide policy makers, arms control experts and arms export control officers with systematically compiled, relevant information, which will enable them to develop effective, evidence-based counter-proliferation strategies against the illicit spread of SALW and of other conventional weapons and their ammunition in order to improve international and regional security. It will thus support them to combine a successful reactive strategy with adequate preventive action to tackle illegal supply and demand, and to ensure effective conventional arms control in third countries.",
  "extent": "E+W+S+N.I.",
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudn/2013/698/annex/division/1/division/1.1",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-11-01T15:14:57.511351+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}