{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2014-912/annex/division-4/division-4.3/division-4.3.4/division-2",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2014-912/annex/division-4/division-4.3/division-4.3.4/division-2.json",
  "legislation": "eudn/2014/912",
  "legislation_title": "Council Decision 2014/912/CFSP of 15 December 2014 in support of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) activities to reduce the risk of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their ammunition in the Sahel region",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2014-912",
  "path": "annex/division/4/division/4.3/division/4.3.4/division/2",
  "kind": "division",
  "number": null,
  "heading": "Description",
  "text": "Limited PSSM infrastructure leaves countries extremely vulnerable to diversion of SALW when these are stored in small armouries in remote locations, including in volatile border regions, and during transfer. In the case of robbery, theft or looting that diverts the weapon to a non-State actor, a weapon becomes accessible and available to misuse, if it is not individually secured.\nNew mobile and flexible technologies may offer solutions to effectively secure SALW in instances when the risk of diversion is at the highest. The technology could offer appropriate cost effective solutions for Member States that are lacking a large weapons security infrastructure.\nElectronics could add a layer of additional security and safety for small arms. A system that secures the individual weapon at the point of collection from a secure armoury, keeps it secured during transport and temporary storage until it reaches its final secure destination, could significantly reduce the risk of diversion of weapons in cases of robbery, theft or looting. Electronic systems locking or deactivating the individual weapon during transfer and temporary storage could use locks with digital, radio-frequency or biometric codes, which would improve PSSM at the most vulnerable points. Digital keys would not be available during transport, as they could be transmitted via other means of communication, such as e-mails or SMS messages, to authorised persons. These protection means would disable unauthorised personnel to use weapons diverted into illegal market as a result of theft, robbery or looting.\nUNREC will carry out an assessment of the potential of new technologies to secure SALW that meet the needs of the region through consultation with regional organisations and National Commissions on SALW and in cooperation with industry. Experience from neighbouring countries of the subregion on the use of smart technology to secure weapons during the DDR process will also be taken into account, for example the case study of Côte d'Ivoire.\nThe assessment will also identify facilities and transportation routes in Burkina Faso and Chad where such technology can be piloted. Such conventional weapons and ammunition stockpiling and weapons security technology (including for transport) will be introduced in up to four depots.\nThe findings of the assessment and the pilot activity will be the base for a guidance document outlining a long-term roadmap for the possible use of such new technologies in Africa and will be shared with all States in the Sahel region, with regional and subregional organisations and at international technical conferences and meetings.",
  "extent": "E+W+S+N.I.",
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudn/2014/912/annex/division/4/division/4.3/division/4.3.4/division/2",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-11-01T15:14:32.489167+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}