{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2019-2108/annex/division-1/division-1.1",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2019-2108/annex/division-1/division-1.1.json",
  "legislation": "eudn/2019/2108",
  "legislation_title": "Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2019-2108",
  "path": "annex/division/1/division/1.1",
  "kind": "division",
  "number": "1.1",
  "heading": "Introduction",
  "text": "The Biological Weapons Convention entered into force in 1975 and has been ratified by all but one country (Haiti) in Latin America and the Caribbean. Nonetheless, after more than forty years, many of those same countries lack the domestic legal and regulatory framework needed to fully implement the BWC. That Convention sets out, among other things, certain biosafety standards for reducing bacteriological and other biological threats which may result in harm to life on earth.\nIn an effort to further efforts to counter such threats, the UN Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in 2004 (‘UNSCR 1540 (2004)’). That resolution requires all States to take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Under Operative Paragraph 3a of UNSCR 1540 (2004) such measures shall include establishing appropriate controls over related materials and, to this end developing and maintaining appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport.\nEvery five years the 1540 Committee conducts a comprehensive review of the efforts made by Member States to implement obligations under UNSCR 1540 (2004). The final document of the 2016 Comprehensive Review drew some important conclusions. First, the document notes that while States have made some progress in securing and protecting sensitive materials, gaps in these areas remain. Second, the Committee noted that efforts to account for and secure materials related to biological weapons lag behind those for safeguarding materials related to nuclear and chemical weapons. Third, the Committee noted that there has been no increase in States’ implementation of measures called for by UNSCR 1540 (2004) since 2011. As a result, the Committee concluded that States should take urgent action to adopt measures to account for and secure materials related to biological weapons.\nAn incident involving the introduction and potential spread of a pathogenic biological agent, whether by an actor intending harm to a target population or by naturally occurring means, has the potential to cause significant human, economic, and political harm in the OAS region. In light of that potential threat, the OAS has sought to increase biosafety and biosecurity awareness and capacity in the Americas. Since 2009, for example, the Inter‐American Committee Against Terrorism (‘OAS/CICTE’), through its Secretariat (the ‘Secretariat’), has led several national bio-incident crisis management exercises aimed at raising awareness of biosecurity threats and bringing together officials and representatives from agencies and organisations to learn how to coordinate their responses to a bio‐incident. Furthermore, a number of OAS Member States have specifically requested the Secretariat’s assistance to draft or update National Bio-Emergency Response Plans.\nWhile these and other efforts to enhance bio-incident readiness and response capabilities have yielded important results, there nonetheless remains a lack of engagement and investment in biosafety and biosecurity among many OAS Member States. This is reflected in the lack of needed infrastructure, capacity, and legal frameworks to effectively detect and respond to a biological incident. The large and disproportionate death toll in the Americas from the 2009 global outbreak of H1N1 highlights the above vulnerabilities and underscores the need for a greater focus on biosafety and biosecurity. It is believed, for example, that more people died in the Americas from the 2009 H1N1 swine flu than in the rest of the world.\nThe lack of engagement on the part of governments in the region on biosafety and biosecurity stems from a combination of factors, including insufficient awareness of policymakers regarding the threat and potential costs of a large scale biological incident; security-related priorities that compete for scarce resources available at the national level; and the inherent challenges of developing an integrated national bio-incident readiness and response capability. These challenges highlight the need within the OAS region for a coordinated response to biological incidents. Such a response should involve multiple actors at the national and local levels, including government ministries (health, agriculture, security, justice, defence, intelligence, transportation, foreign affairs, international commerce, economy, science and technology, and others), the law enforcement community and other first responders, private sector entities (especially industry and academia), and civil society.",
  "extent": "E+W+S+N.I.",
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudn/2019/2108/annex/division/1/division/1.1",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-11-01T15:12:28.939786+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}