Division Description

The aim of the third component is to support authorities of the interior and police authorities to further improve security infrastructure and standard operating procedures for priority storage locations, which still pose a significant risk of theft and illegal proliferation of SALW and their ammunition. This component is building on Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2356 and is in line with Goal 7 of the Roadmap aimed at a significant decrease of the risk of proliferation and diversion of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and Goal 6 aimed at a systematic decrease of surplus and destruction of seized SALW and ammunition. SEESAC has successfully been using a two‐pronged approach of: (1) improving the security of storage locations; and (2) building the capacity of the personnel tasked with managing stockpiles, significantly increasing security provisions and reducing the risk of the unwanted proliferation of stockpiles of SALW and their ammunition. In line with a comprehensive approach to PSSM of SALW and their ammunition, SEESAC expanded this approach by merging it with the reduction of surpluses, therefore further reducing the risks of proliferation.

The project will continue to improve the security of weapons and ammunition storage in SEE by providing further specific technical and infrastructural assistance in line with international best practices and standards. While security in military storage locations has been significantly increased under Council Decision 2013/730/CFSP, SEESAC has identified stockpiles held by police and authorities of the interior as an area of concern due to the lack of capacity for safeguarding, inadequate record‐keeping and stockpile management capabilities, and more complex systems which include formation weapons as well as confiscated firearms. Support will be provided for enhanced security of police/authority of the interior SALW storages and evidence rooms through infrastructure upgrades. Evidence rooms located in local police stations are a priority, as a potential hazard for diversion exists but also in terms of public safety where several hazardous materials are kept together under poor storage conditions. Support will also be provided for reduction of surplus or confiscated SALW and ammunition thus further decreasing the risk of their illicit proliferation.

Main activities envisaged:

• support for enhanced security of police/authority of interior SALW storages and evidence rooms through infrastructure upgrades;

• support for destruction of surplus and/or confiscated SALW;

• provision of regional thematic workshops in the field of weapons and ammunition stockpile management;

• strengthening the capacities of relevant state institutions to establish inspection systems.

Project results/implementation indicators:

• security of one storage location enhanced in accordance with international standards and best practices;

• security of up to 18 evidence rooms increased;

• a total of up to 12 000 pieces of conventional weapons destroyed;

• a total of up to 22 000 pieces of ammunition destroyed;

• up to three thematic workshops provided.