{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2020-1127/annex",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2020-1127/annex.json",
  "legislation": "eudn/2020/1127",
  "legislation_title": "Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1127 of 30 July 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/797 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-decision-2020-1127",
  "path": "annex",
  "kind": "annex",
  "number": null,
  "heading": null,
  "text": "The following persons and entities or bodies are added to the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2019/797:\n‘A.\nNatural persons\nName\nIdentifying information\nReasons\nDate of listing\n1.\nGAO Qiang\nPlace of birth: Shandong Province, China\nAddress: Room 1102, Guanfu Mansion, 46 Xinkai Road, Hedong District, Tianjin, China\nNationality: Chinese\nGender: male\nGao Qiang is involved in “Operation Cloud Hopper”, a series of cyber-attacks with a significant effect originating from outside the Union and constituting an external threat to the Union or its Member States and of cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States.\n“Operation Cloud Hopper” targeted information systems of multinational companies in six continents, including companies located in the Union, and gained unauthorised access to commercially sensitive data, resulting in significant economic loss.\nThe actor publicly known as “APT10” (“Advanced Persistent Threat 10”) (a.k.a. “Red Apollo”, “CVNX”, “Stone Panda”, “MenuPass” and “Potassium”) carried out “Operation Cloud Hopper”.\nGao Qiang can be linked to APT10, including through his association with APT10 command and control infrastructure. Moreover, Huaying Haitai, an entity designated for providing support to and facilitating “Operation Cloud Hopper”, employed Gao Qiang. He has links with Zhang Shilong, who is also designated in connection with “Operation Cloud Hopper”. Gao Qiang is therefore associated with both Huaying Haitai and Zhang Shilong.\n30.7.2020\n2.\nZHANG Shilong\nAddress: Hedong, Yuyang Road No 121, Tianjin, China\nNationality: Chinese\nGender: male\nZhang Shilong is involved in “Operation Cloud Hopper”, a series of cyber-attacks with a significant effect originating from outside the Union and constituting an external threat to the Union or its Member States and of cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States.\n“Operation Cloud Hopper” has targeted information systems of multinational companies in six continents, including companies located in the Union, and gained unauthorised access to commercially sensitive data, resulting in significant economic loss.\nThe actor publicly known as “APT10” (“Advanced Persistent Threat 10”) (a.k.a. “Red Apollo”, “CVNX”, “Stone Panda”, “MenuPass” and “Potassium”) carried out “Operation Cloud Hopper”.\nZhang Shilong can be linked to APT10, including through the malware he developed and tested in connection with the cyber-attacks carried out by APT10. Moreover, Huaying Haitai, an entity designated for providing support to and facilitating “Operation Cloud Hopper”, employed Zhang Shilong. He has links with Gao Qiang, who is also designated in connection with “Operation Cloud Hopper”. Zhang Shilong is therefore associated with both Huaying Haitai and Gao Qiang.\n30.7.2020\n3.\nAlexey Valeryevich MININ\nАлексей Валерьевич МИНИН\nDate of birth: 27 May 1972\nPlace of birth: Perm Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)\nPassport number: 120017582\nIssued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation\nValidity: from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022\nLocation: Moscow, Russian Federation\nNationality: Russian\nGender: male\nAlexey Minin took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands.\nAs a human intelligence support officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Alexey Minin was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW.\n30.7.2020\n4.\nAleksei Sergeyvich MORENETS\nАлексей Сергеевич МОРЕНЕЦ\nDate of birth: 31 July 1977\nPlace of birth: Murmanskaya Oblast, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)\nPassport number: 100135556\nIssued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation\nValidity: from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022\nLocation: Moscow, Russian Federation\nNationality: Russian\nGender: male\nAleksei Morenets took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands.\nAs a cyber-operator for the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Aleksei Morenets was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW.\n30.7.2020\n5.\nEvgenii Mikhaylovich SEREBRIAKOV\nЕвгений Михайлович СЕРЕБРЯКОВ\nDate of birth: 26 July 1981\nPlace of birth: Kursk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)\nPassport number: 100135555\nIssued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation\nValidity: from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022\nLocation: Moscow, Russian Federation\nNationality: Russian\nGender: male\nEvgenii Serebriakov took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands.\nAs a cyber-operator for the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Evgenii Serebriakov was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW.\n30.7.2020\n6.\nOleg Mikhaylovich SOTNIKOV\nОлег Михайлович СОТНИКОВ\nDate of birth: 24 August 1972\nPlace of birth: Ulyanovsk, Russian SFSR (now Russian Federation)\nPassport number: 120018866\nIssued by: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation\nValidity: from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022\nLocation: Moscow, Russian Federation\nNationality: Russian\nGender: male\nOleg Sotnikov took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in the Netherlands.\nAs a human intelligence support officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Oleg Sotnikov was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW’s ongoing investigatory work. The Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (DISS) (Militaire Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – MIVD) disrupted the attempted cyber-attack, thereby preventing serious damage to the OPCW.\n30.7.2020\nB.\nLegal persons, entities and bodies\nName\nIdentifying information\nReasons\nDate of listing\n1.\nTianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Co. Ltd (Huaying Haitai)\na.k.a.: Haitai Technology Development Co. Ltd\nLocation: Tianjin, China\nHuaying Haitai provided financial, technical or material support for and facilitated “Operation Cloud Hopper”, a series of cyber-attacks with a significant effect originating from outside the Union and constituting an external threat to the Union or its Member States and of cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States.\n“Operation Cloud Hopper” has targeted information systems of multinational companies in six continents, including companies located in the Union, and gained unauthorised access to commercially sensitive data, resulting in significant economic loss.\nThe actor publicly known as “APT10” (“Advanced Persistent Threat 10”) (a.k.a. “Red Apollo”, “CVNX”, “Stone Panda”, “MenuPass” and “Potassium”) carried out “Operation Cloud Hopper”.\nHuaying Haitai can be linked to APT10. Moreover, Huaying Haitai employed Gao Qiang and Zhang Shilong, who are both designated in connection with “Operation Cloud Hopper”. Huaying Haitai is therefore associated with Gao Qiang and Zhang Shilong.\n30.7.2020\n2.\nChosun Expo\na.k.a.: Chosen Expo; Korea Export Joint Venture\nLocation: DPRK\nChosun Expo provided financial, technical or material support for and facilitated a series of cyber-attacks with a significant effect originating from outside the Union and constituting an external threat to the Union or its Member States and of cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States, including the cyber-attacks publicly known as “WannaCry” and cyber-attacks against the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and Sony Pictures Entertainment, as well as cyber-theft from the Bangladesh Bank and attempted cyber-theft from the Vietnam Tien Phong Bank.\n“WannaCry” disrupted information systems around the world by targeting information systems with ransomware and blocking access to data. It affected information systems of companies in the Union, including information systems relating to services necessary for the maintenance of essential services and economic activities within Member States.\nThe actor publicly known as “APT38” (“Advanced Persistent Threat 38”) or the “Lazarus Group” carried out “WannaCry”.\nChosun Expo can be linked to APT38/the Lazarus Group, including through the accounts used for the cyber-attacks.\n30.7.2020\n3.\nMain Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU)\nAddress: 22 Kirova Street, Moscow, Russian Federation\nThe Main Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), also known by its field post number 74455, is responsible for cyber-attacks with a significant effect originating from outside the Union and constituting an external threat to the Union or its Member States and for cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States, including the cyber-attacks publicly known as “NotPetya” or “EternalPetya” in June 2017 and the cyber-attacks directed at an Ukrainian power grid in the winter of 2015 and 2016.\n“NotPetya” or “EternalPetya” rendered data inaccessible in a number of companies in the Union, wider Europe and worldwide, by targeting computers with ransomware and blocking access to data, resulting amongst others in significant economic loss. The cyber-attack on a Ukrainian power grid resulted in parts of it being switched off during winter.\nThe actor publicly known as “Sandworm” (a.k.a. “Sandworm Team”, “BlackEnergy Group”, “Voodoo Bear”, “Quedagh”, “Olympic Destroyer” and “Telebots”), which is also behind the attack on the Ukrainian power grid, carried out “NotPetya” or “EternalPetya”.\nThe Main Centre for Special Technologies of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has an active role in the cyber-activities undertaken by Sandworm and can be linked to Sandworm.\n30.7.2020\n’",
  "extent": "E+W+S+N.I.",
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eudn/2020/1127/annex",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-11-01T15:12:12.162745+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}