Division 2 OBJECTIVES

The SGM, by promptly investigating the alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons, and establishing facts related to the allegations, could serve to uphold global norms against the use of such weapons, to help deter the use of such weapons by UN Member States, individuals or organisations, and ultimately to preserve international peace and security.

Activities in support of enhancing the level of preparedness of the SGM for the investigation of the alleged use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons are consistent with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Decision (CFSP) 2016/51, and in particular its Project 5 ‘Support to the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism’, sought to support the strengthening of the SGM through expanding the number of suitably trained experts on the SGM’s roster of experts and laboratories (the ‘SGM roster’), by convening a meeting of SGM stakeholders and by organising a number of cross-organisational training events. Project 5 of Decision (CFSP) 2016/51 provided basic and specialised skills training for rostered experts through a new systematic training concept, a network of designated analytical laboratories and capacity-building activities for such laboratories, and also outreach activities to promote geographical diversity of experts and laboratories.

There is a need to continue these activities in order to further strengthen international capacity and capability to promptly investigate any violations of the global prohibition on the use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons, with a particular focus on biological weapons. Promoting geographic diversity and gender balance of experts would contribute to enhancing the credibility and legitimacy of the SGM. Further developing the capacity and capability of experts and designated laboratories could also have positive secondary effects on biological research and on public health research and development, especially in developing countries. In addition, implementation of such activities will serve as an example of concrete support to the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament ‘Securing our Common Future’, and in particular Action 10 of that Agenda entitled ‘readiness to investigate alleged use of biological weapons’.

Principles

1. (a)

   Making best use of the experience gained through Decisions 2012/421/CFSP and (CFSP) 2016/51.

2. (b)

   Bearing in mind the lessons learned from the 2013 SGM investigation in Syria.

3. (c)

   Actively encouraging the nomination of experts and laboratories from the Global South to the SGM roster, sourced through networks and strategic stakeholders in the Global South.

4. (d)

   Building strategic partnerships with relevant institutions.

5. (e)

   Seeking a broader range of expertise in the SGM roster and actively encouraging the nomination of female experts to that roster.

6. (f)

   Supporting the efforts of interested UN Member States to ensure the full operational readiness of the SGM.

7. (g)

   Contributing to the implementation of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament.

Expected outcomes

The implementation of this project is expected to produce the following overall outcomes:

1. (a)

   enhancement of the operational readiness of the SGM;

2. (b)

   further development of the network of designated laboratories;

3. (c)

   enhancement of experts’ skills needed in the context of the SGM missions; and

4. (d)

   diversification of expertise in the SGM roster.

In addition, the implementation of this project would have the following secondary outcomes:

1. (a)

   harmonisation of national, regional and international biological weapons investigation architecture;

2. (b)

   enhanced knowledge and capacity of investigation into alleged use of biological and chemical weapons at a national level; and

3. (c)

   awareness-raising with UN Member States and relevant stakeholders.