Appendix 2 TACHOGRAPH CARDS SPECIFICATIONF1F2

For the purpose of this appendix, the following abbreviations apply:

The following references are used in this Appendix:

TCS_200 All electronic signals shall be in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-3 unless specified otherwise.

TCS_201 The location and dimensions of the card contacts shall comply with the ISO/IEC 7816-2.

TCS_202 The card shall work according to specifications within the consumption limits specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3.

TCS_203 X1The card shall work with V _CC = 3 V (± 0,3 V) or with V _CC = 5 V (± 0,5 V).

Voltage selection shall be performed according to ISO/IEC 7816-3.

TCS_204 The card shall not require a programming voltage at pin C6. It is expected that pin C6 is not connected in an IFD. Contact C6 may be connected to V _cc in the card but shall not be connected to ground. This voltage should not be interpreted in any case.

TCS_205 The card shall operate within a frequency range of 1 to 5 MHz. Within one card session the clock frequency may vary ± 2 %. The clock frequency is generated by the Vehicle Unit and not the card itself. The duty cycle may vary between 40 and 60 %.

TCS_206 Under conditions contained into the card file EF _ICC , the external clock can be stopped. The first byte of the EF _ICC file body codes the Clockstop mode conditions (see EN 726-3 for further details):

Bits 4 to 8 are not used.

TCS_207 The I/O contact C7 is used to receive data from and to transmit data to the IFD. During operation only either the card or the IFD shall be in transmit mode. Should both units be in transmit mode no damage shall occur to the card. Unless transmitting, the card shall enter the reception mode.

TCS_208 The card works in two states while the supply voltage is applied:

• operation state while executing commands or interfacing with Digital Unit,

• idle state at all other times; in this state all data shall be retained by the card.

This paragraph describes the minimum functionality required by Tachograph cards and VUs to ensure correct operation and interoperability.

Tachograph cards are as compliant as possible with the available ISO/IEC applicable norms (especially ISO/IEC 7816). However, commands and protocols are fully described in order to specify some restricted usage or some differences if they exist. The commands specified are fully compliant with the referred norms except where indicated.

TCS_300 The Transmission protocol shall be compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-3. In particular, the VU shall recognise waiting time extensions sent by the card.

TCS_301 The card shall provide both protocol T=0 and protocol T=1.

TCS_302 T=0 is the default protocol, a PTS command is therefore necessary to change the protocol to T=1.

TCS_303 Devices shall support direct convention in both protocols: the direct convention is hence mandatory for the card.

TCS_304 The Information Field Size Card byte shall be presented at the ATR in character TA3. This value shall be at least ′F0h′ (= 240 bytes).

The following restrictions apply to the protocols:

• TCS_305 T=0

  • The interface device shall support an answer on I/O after the rising edge of the signal on RST from 400 cc.

  • The interface device shall be able to read characters separated with 12 etu.

  • The interface device shall read an erroneous character and its repetition if separated with 13 etu. If an erroneous character is detected, the Error signal on I/O can occur between 1 etu and 2 etu. The device shall support a 1 etu delay.

  • The interface device shall accept a 33 bytes ATR (TS+32)

  • If TC1 is present in the ATR, the Extra Guard Time shall be present for characters sent by the interface device although characters sent by the card can still be separated with 12 etu. This is also true for the ACK character sent by the card after a P3 character emitted by the interface device.

  • The interface device shall take into account a NUL character emitted by the card.

  • The interface device shall accept the complementary mode for ACK.

  • The get-response command cannot be used in chaining mode to get a data which length could exceed 255 bytes.

• TCS_306 T=1

  • NAD byte: not used (NAD shall be set to ′00′).

  • S-block ABORT: not used.

  • S-block VPP state error: not used.

  • The total chaining length for a data field will not exceed 255 bytes (to be ensured by the IFD).

  • The Information Field Size Device (IFSD) shall be indicated by the IFD immediately after the ATR: the IFD shall transmit the S-Block IFS request after the ATR and the card shall send back S-Block IFS. The recommended value for IFSD is 254 bytes.

  • The card will not ask for an IFS readjustment.

TCS_307 The device checks ATR bytes, according to ISO/IEC 7816-3. No verification shall be done on ATR Historical Characters.

TCS_308 After the Answer To Reset (ATR), the Master File (MF) is implicitly selected and becomes the Current Directory.

TCS_309 The default Protocol is T=0. To set the T=1 protocol, a PTS (also known as PPS) must be sent to the card by the device.

TCS_310 As both T=0 and T=1 protocols are mandatory for the card, the basic PTS for protocol switching is mandatory for the card.

The PTS can be used, as indicated in ISO/IEC 7816-3, to switch to higher baud rates than the default one proposed by the card in the ATR if any (TA(1) byte).

Higher baud rates are optional for the card.

TCS_311 If no other baud rate than the default one are supported (or if the selected baud rate is not supported), the card shall respond to the PTS correctly according to ISO/IEC 7816-3 by omitting the PPS1 byte.

Examples of basic PTS for protocol selection are the following:

Access Conditions (AC) for the UPDATE_BINARY and READ_BINARY commands are defined for each Elementary File.

TCS_312 The AC of the current file must be met before accessing the file via these commands.

The definitions of the available access conditions are the following:

On the processing commands (UPDATE_BINARY and READ_BINARY), the following access conditions can be set in the card:

The PRO SM access condition is not available for the READ_BINARY command. It means that the presence of a cryptographic checksum for a READ command is never mandatory. However, using the value ′OC′ for the class, it is possible to use the READ_BINARY command with secure messaging, as described in paragraph 3.6.2.

When confidentiality of data to be read from a file needs to be protected, the file is marked as ‘ Encrypted ’ . Encryption is performed using secure messaging (See Appendix 11).

Commands and file organisation are deduced from and complies with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

TCS_313 This section describes the following APDU command-response pairs:

TCS_314 The status word SW1 SW2 are returned in any response message and denote the processing state of the command.

The mandatory commands for the Tachograph cards are described in this chapter.

Additional relevant details, related to cryptographic operations involved, are given in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms.

All commands are described independently of the used protocol (T=0 or T=1). The APDU bytes CLA, INS, P1, P2, Lc and Le are always indicated. If Lc or Le is not needed for the described command, the associated length, value and description are empty.

TCS_315 If both length bytes (Lc and Le) are requested, the described command has to be split in two parts if the IFD is using protocol T=0: the IFD sends the command as described with P3=Lc + data and then sends a GET_RESPONSE (see point 3.6.6) command with P3=Le.

TCS_316 If both length bytes are requested, and Le=0 (secure messaging):

• When using protocol T=1, the card shall answer to Le=0 by sending all available output data.

• When using protocol T=0, the IFD shall send the first command with P3=Lc + data, the card shall answer (to this implicit Le=0) by the Status bytes ′61La′, where La is the number of response bytes available. The IFD shall then generate a GET RESPONSE command with P3=La to read the data.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the norm.

The SELECT FILE command is used:

• to select an application DF (selection by name must be used)

• to select an elementary file corresponding to the submitted file ID

This command allows to select an application DF in the card.

TCS_317 This command can be performed from anywhere in the file structure (after the ATR or at anytime).

TCS_318 The selection of an application resets the current security environment. After performing the application selection, no current public key is selected anymore and the former session key is no longer available for secure messaging. The AUT access condition is also lost.

No response to the SELECT FILE command is needed (Le absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the application corresponding with the AID is not found, the processing state returned is ′6A82′,

• in T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is ′6700′,

• in T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT FILE command, the state returned is ′6900′,

• if the selected application is considered corrupted (integrity error is detected within the file attributes), the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

No response to the SELECT FILE command is needed (Le absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the file corresponding with the file identifier is not found, the processing state returned is ′6A82′,

• in T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is ′6700′,

• in T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT FILE command, the state returned is ′6900′,

• if the selected file is considered corrupted (integrity error is detected within the file attributes), the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the norm.

The Read Binary command is used to read data from a transparent file.

The response of the card consists of returning the data read, optionally encapsulated in a secure messaging structure.

TCS_323 The command can be performed only if the security status satisfies the security attributes defined for the EF for the READ function.

This command enables the IFD to read data from the EF currently selected, without secure messaging.

TCS_324 Reading data from a file marked as ‘ Encrypted ’ shall not be possible through this command.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if no EF is selected, the processing state returned is ′6986′,

• if the Access Control of the selected file are not satisfied, the command is interrupted with ′6982′,

• if the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is ′6B00′,

• if the size of the data to be read is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the processing state returned is ′6700′ or ′6Cxx′, where ′xx′ indicates the exact length,

• if an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′,

• if an integrity error is detected within the stored data, the card shall return the demanded data, and the processing state returned is ′6281′.

This command enables the IDF to read data from the EF currently selected with secure messaging, in order to verify the integrity of the data received and to protect the confidentiality of the data in the case the EF is marked as ‘ Encrypted ’ .

TCS_328 Response Message if EF is not marked as ‘ Encrypted ’ and if Secure Messaging input format is correct:

TCS_329 Response Message if EF is marked as ‘ Encrypted ’ and if Secure Messaging input format is correct:

The encrypted data returned contain a first byte indicating the used padding mode. For the tachograph application, the padding indicator always takes the value '01h', indicating that the used padding mode is the one specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4 (one byte with value ′80h′ followed by some null bytes: ISO/IEC 9797 method 2).

The ‘ regular ’ processing states, described for the READ BINARY command with no secure messaging (see point 3.6.2.1), can be returned using the response message structures described above, under a ′99h′ Tag (as described in TCS 335).

Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state is simply returned, with no secure messaging structure involved:

• If no current session key is available, the processing state ′6A88′ is returned. It happens either if the session key has not already been generated or if the session key validity has expired (in this case the IFD must re-run a mutual authentication process to set a new session key).

• If some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing in the secure messaging format, the processing state ′6987′ is returned: this error happens if an expected tag is missing or if the command body is not properly constructed.

• If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is ′6988′: this error happens if all the required tags are present but some lengths are different from the ones expected.

• If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails, the processing state returned is ′6688′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the norm.

The UPDATE BINARY command message initiates the update (erase + write) of the bits already present in an EF binary with the bits given in the command APDU.

TCS_331 The command can be performed only if the security status satisfies the security attributes defined for the EF for the UPDATE function (If the access control of the UPDATE function includes PRO SM, a secure messaging must be added in the command).

This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently selected, without the card verifying the integrity of data received. This plain mode is allowed only if the related file is not marked as ‘ Encrypted ’ .

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if no EF is selected, the processing state returned is ′6986′,

• if the Access Control of the selected file are not satisfied, the command is interrupted with ′6982′,

• if the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is ′6B00′,

• if the size of the data to be written is not compatible with the size of the EF F3(Offset + Lc > EF size) the processing state returned is ′6700′,

• if an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unrecoverable, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6500′,

• if writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned is ′6581′.

This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently selected, with the card verifying the integrity of data received. As no confidentiality is required, the data are not encrypted.

The ‘ regular ’ processing states, described for the UPDATE BINARY command with no secure messaging (see point 3.6.3.1), can be returned using the response message structure described above.

Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state is simply returned, with no secure messaging structure involved:

• If no current session key is available, the processing state ′6A88′ is returned,

• if some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing in the secure messaging format, the processing state ′6987′ is returned: this error happens if an expected tag is missing or if the command body is not properly constructed,

• if some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is ′6988′: this error happens if all the required tags are present but some lengths are different from the ones expected,

• if the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails, the processing state returned is ′6688′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the norm.

The GET CHALLENGE command asks the card to issue a challenge in order to use it in a security related procedure in which a cryptogram or some ciphered data are sent to the card.

TCS_337 The Challenge issued by the card is only valid for the next command, which uses a challenge, sent to the card.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if Le is different from ′08h′, the processing state is ′6700′,

• if parameters P1-P2 are incorrect, the processing state is ′6A86′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the norm.

The Verify command initiates the comparison in the card of the CHV (PIN) data sent from the command with the reference CHV stored in the card.

TCS_340 If the command is successful, the rights corresponding to CHV presentation are opened and the remaining CHV attempt counter is reinitialised.

TCS_341 An unsuccessful comparison is recorded in the card in order to limit the number of further attempts of the use of the reference CHV.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the reference CHV is not found, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if the CHV is blocked, (the remaining attempt counter of the CHV is null), the processing state returned is ′6983′. Once in that state, the CHV can never be successfully presented anymore,

• if the comparison is unsuccessful, the remaining attempt Counter is decreased and the status ′63CX′ is returned (X > 0, and X equals the remaining CHV attempts counter. X = ′F′, the CHV attempts counter is greater than ′F′),

• if the reference CHV is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

This command (only necessary and available for T=0 Protocol) is used to transmit prepared data from the card to the interface device (case where a command had included both Lc and Le).

The GET_RESPONSE command has to be issued immediately after the command preparing the data, otherwise, the data are lost. After the execution of the GET_RESPONSE command (except if the error ′61xx′ or ′6Cxx′ occur, see below), the previously prepared data are no longer available.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′.

• If no data have been prepared by the card, the processing state returned is ′6900′ or ′6F00′.

• If Le exceeds the number of available bytes or if Le is null, the processing state returned is ′6Cxx′, where ′xx′ denotes the exact number of available bytes. In that case, the prepared data are still available for a subsequent GET_RESPONSE command.

• If Le is not null and is smaller than the number of available bytes, the required data are sent normally by the card, and the processing state returned is ′61xx′, where ′xx′ indicates a number of extra bytes still available by a subsequent GET_RESPONSE command.

• If the command is not supported (protocol T=1), the card returns ′6D00′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the norm.

The VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is used by the card to obtain a Public Key from the outside and to check its validity.

TCS_346 When a VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is successful, the Public Key is stored for a future use in the Security environment. This key shall be explicitly set for the use in security related commands (INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE or VERIFY CERTIFICATE) by the MSE command (see point 3.6.10) using its key identifier.

TCS_347 In any case, the VERIFY CERTIFICATE command uses the public key previously selected by the MSE command to open the certificate. This public key must be the one of a Member State or of Europe.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the certificate verification fails, the processing state returned is ′6688′. The verification and unwrapping process of the certificate is described in Appendix 11,

• if no Public Key is present in the Security Environment, ′6A88′ is returned,

• if the selected public key (used to unwrap the certificate) is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′,

• if the selected public key (used to unwrap the certificate) has a CHA.LSB ( CertificateHolderAuthorisation.equipmentType ) different from ′00′ (i.e. is not the one of a Member State or of Europe), the processing state returned is ′6985′.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the IFD can authenticate the card.

The authentication process is described in Appendix 11. It includes the following statements:

TCS_350 The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command uses the card Private Key (implicitly selected) to sign authentication data including K1 (first element for session key agreement) and RND1, and uses the Public Key currently selected (through the last MSE command) to encrypt the signature and form the authentication token (more details in Appendix 11).

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if no Public Key is present in the Security Environment, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if no Private Key is present in the Security Environment, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if VU.CHR does not match the current public key identifier, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if the selected private key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

TCS_353 If the INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command is successful, the current session key, if existing, is erased and no longer available. In order to have a new session key available, the EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command must be successfully performed.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the card can authenticate the IFD.

The authentication process is described in Appendix 11. It includes the following statements:

TCS_354 A GET CHALLENGE command must precede the EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command immediately. The card issues a challenge to the outside (RND3).

TCS_355 The verification of the cryptogram uses RND3 (challenge issued by the card), the card private key (implicitly selected) and the public key previously selected by the MSE command.

TCS_356 The card verifies the cryptogram, and if it is correct, the AUT access condition is opened.

TCS_357 The input cryptogram carries the second element for session key agreement K2.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if no Public Key is present in the Security Environment, ′6A88′ is returned,

• if the CHA of the currently set public key is not the concatenation of the Tachograph application AID and of a VU equipment Type, the processing state returned is ′6F00′ (see Appendix 11),

• if no Private Key is present in the Security Environment, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if the verification of the cryptogram is wrong, the processing state returned is ′6688′,

• if the command is not immediately preceded with a GET CHALLENGE command, the processing state returned is ′6985′,

• if the selected private key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

TCS_360 If the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is successful, and if the first part of the session key is available from a successful INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE recently performed, the session key is set for future commands using secure messaging.

TCS_361 If the first session key part is not available from a previous INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the second part of the session key, sent by the IFD, is not stored in the card. This mechanism ensures that the mutual authentication process is done in the order specified in Appendix 11.

This command is used to set a public key for authentication purpose.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_362 The key referenced in the MSE data field is valid for every file of the Tachograph DF.

TCS_363 The key referenced in the MSE data field remains the current public key until the next correct MSE command.

TCS_364 If the key referenced is not (already) present into the card, the security environment remains unchanged.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the referenced key is not present into the card, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if some expected data objects are missing in the secure messaging format, the processing state ′6987′ is returned. This can happen if the tag ′83h′ is missing,

• if some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is ′6988′. This can happen if the length of the key identifier is not ′08h′,

• if the selected key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

This command is used to transfer to the card the result of a hash calculation on some data. This command is used for the verification of digital signatures. The hash value is stored in EEPROM for the subsequent command verify digital signature.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing, the processing state ′6987′ is returned. This can happen if one of the tag ′90h′ is missing,

• if some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is ′6988′. This error happens if the required tag is present but with a length different from ′14h′.

This command is not compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. Thus the CLA byte of this command indicates that there is a proprietary use of the PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION/HASH.

TCS_369 The perform hash file command is used to hash the data area of the currently selected transparent EF.

TCS_370 The result of the hash operation is stored in the card. It can then be used to get a digital signature of the file, using the PSO-COMPUTE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE command. This result remains available for the COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE command until the next successful PERFORM HASH of FILE command.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if no application is selected, the processing state ′6985′ is returned,

• if the selected EF is considered corrupted (file attributes or stored data integrity errors), the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′,

• if the selected file is not a transparent file, the processing state returned is ′6986′.

This command is used to compute the digital signature of previously computed hash code (see PERFORM HASH of FILE, point 3.6.12).

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_373 The card private key is used to compute the digital signature and is implicitly known by the card.

TCS_374 The card performs a digital signature using a padding method compliant with PKCS1 (see Appendix 11 for details).

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the implicitly selected private key is considered as corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

This command is used to verify the digital signature, provided as an input, in accordance with PKCS1 of a message, whose hash is known to the card. The signature algorithm is implicitly known by the card.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_377 The Verify Digital Signature command always uses the public key selected by the previous Manage Security Environment command, and the previous hash code entered by a PSO: hash command.

• If the command is successful, the card returns ′9000′,

• if the verification of the signature fails, the processing state returned is ′6688′. The verification process is described in Appendix 11,

• if no public key is selected, the processing state returned is ′6A88′,

• if some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing, the processing state ′6987′ is returned. This can happen if one of the required tag is missing,

• if no hash code is available to process the command (as a result of a previous PSO: hash command), the processing state returned is ′6985′,

• if some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is ′6988′. This can happen if one of the required data objects length is incorrect,

• if the selected public key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is ′6400′ or ′6581′.

This paragraph specifies the file structures of the Tachograph cards for storage of accessible data,

It does not specify card manufacturer dependant internal structures, such as e.g. file headers, nor storage and handling of data elements needed for internal use only such as EuropeanPublicKey, CardPrivateKey, TDesSessionKey or WorkshopCardPin .

The useful storage capacity of Tachograph cards shall be of 11 Kbytes minimum. Greater capacities may be used. In such case, the structure of the card remains the same, but the number of records of some elements of the structure is increased. This paragraph specifies minimum and maximum values of these record numbers.

TCS_400 After its personalisation, the driver card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

TCS_401 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_402 Read with secure messaging shall be possible for all files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_403 The driver card shall have the following data structure:

TCS_404 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values the driver card data structure must use:

TCS_405 After its personalisation, the workshop card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

TCS_406 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_407 Read with secure messaging shall be possible for all files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_408 The workshop card shall have the following data structure:

TCS_409 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values the workshop card data structure must use:

TCS_410 After its personalisation, the control card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

TCS_411 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_412 Read with secure messaging shall be possible for files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_413 The control card shall have the following data structure:

TCS_414 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values the control card data structure must use:

TCS_415 After its personalisation, the company card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

TCS_416 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_417 Read with secure messaging shall be possible for all files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_418 The company card shall have the following data structure:

TCS_419 The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values the company card data structure must use: