{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-regulation-2015-409/introduction",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-regulation-2015-409/introduction.json",
  "legislation": "eur/2015/409",
  "legislation_title": "Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/409 of 11 March 2015 amending Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-regulation-2015-409",
  "path": "introduction",
  "kind": "introduction",
  "number": null,
  "heading": "Introductory text",
  "text": "Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/409\nof 11 March 2015\namending Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China\nTHE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,\nHaving regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,\nHaving regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community (‘the basic Regulation’), and in particular Article 11(3) thereof,\nWhereas:\n1.\nPROCEDURE\n1.1.\nMeasures in force\n(1)\nOn 15 September 2011 the Council imposed anti-dumping duties on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 (‘the original Regulation’).\n(2)\nA single duty rate of 26,3 % was imposed on imports of the product concerned manufactured by the following group of exporting producers:\nDongguan City Wonderful Ceramics Industrial Park Co., Ltd and Guangdong Jiamei Ceramics Co. Ltd (together referred to as the Wonderful group), and\nQingyuan Gani Ceramics Co. Ltd and Foshan Gani Ceramics Co. Ltd (together referred to as the Gani group).\n(3)\nAs set out in recitals 96 to 98 of the original Regulation, the European Commission (‘the Commission’) was notified after disclosure of provisional findings that the relationship between the companies had been severed and on that basis individual duties for the Gani group and for the Wonderful group should have been applied. The request could not be accepted at that stage as its merits needed to be properly examined.\n1.2.\nRequest for a partial interim review\n(4)\nOn 2 October 2012 the Commission received a request for a partial interim review from the Gani group.\n(5)\nThe Gani group claimed that they were no longer related to the other two companies (the Wonderful group) as the shareholding relationship between them had ceased as of March 2011. The Gani group therefore requested an interim review of the measures in force, as the single duty rate in force was no longer appropriate.\n1.3.\nInitiation of a partial interim review\n(6)\nThe Commission determined, after having consulted the Advisory Committee, that such a review should therefore be opened.\n(7)\nOn 31 January 2014, the Commission initiated a partial interim review of the measures in force on imports into the Union of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China under Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation. It published a Notice of Initiation in the Official Journal of the European Union .\n(8)\nThe review was limited in scope to the examination of the ownership structure of the Gani group and, if warranted, ex officio of the dumping margin as far as the Gani group was concerned.\n(9)\nThe review also covered ex officio the same matters as far as the Wonderful group was concerned.\n1.4.\nReview investigation period\n(10)\nThe investigation of dumping covered the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013 (‘the review investigation period’).\n1.5.\nParties concerned by the investigation\n(11)\nThe Commission invited both the Gani group and the Wonderful group to cooperate with the investigation and to reply to the Commission's questionnaires. In addition, the Commission provided an opportunity for the companies to request market economy treatment under Article 2(7) of the basic Regulation.\n(12)\nIn the Notice of Initiation the Commission had provisionally chosen the United States of America as a third market economy country (‘analogue country’) within the meaning of Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation and invited parties to comment on this choice.\n(13)\nInterested parties had an opportunity to comment on the initiation of the investigation and to request a hearing with the Commission and/or the Hearing Officer for trade proceedings.\n1.6.\nQuestionnaire replies and verification visits\n(14)\nThe Commission received questionnaire replies from both groups and also from two analogue country producers.\n(15)\nThe Commission sought and verified all the information deemed necessary for the review. Verification visits under Article 16 of the basic Regulation were carried out at the premises of the following companies:\nExporting producers in the country concerned:\nDongguan City Wonderful Ceramics Industrial Park Co., Ltd;\nGuangdong Jiamei Ceramics Co. Ltd;\nQingyuan Gani Ceramics Co. Ltd and\nFoshan Gani Ceramics Co. Ltd\nProducers in the analogue country that requested confidential treatment on the basis of risk of retaliation.\n2.\nPRODUCT CONCERNED\n(16)\nThe product subject to this review is the same as defined in the original Regulation, namely glazed and unglazed ceramic flags and paving, hearth or wall tiles; glazed and unglazed ceramic mosaic cubes and the like, whether or not on a backing (‘the product concerned’), currently falling within CN codes 6907 10 00, 6907 90 20, 6907 90 80, 6908 10 00, 6908 90 11, 6908 90 20, 6908 90 31, 6908 90 51, 6908 90 91, 6908 90 93 and 6908 90 99.\n3.\nDUMPING\n3.1.\nMarket Economy Treatment\n(17)\nNeither group requested market economy treatment under Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation.\n3.2.\nAnalogue Country\n(18)\nAs set out above, the Commission proposed the United States of America as analogue country, as it had been in the previous investigation. The Commission also contacted companies in a number of other possible analogue countries, but received no replies or cooperation from any other company. The choice of the United States of America was therefore confirmed as appropriate.\n3.3.\nInvestigation\n(19)\nThe investigation leading to the imposition of the measures in force established that the Gani group and the Wonderful group were related, in so far as one of the shareholders of the Wonderful group owned more than 5 % of the shares in a company in the Gani group. Dumping margins were calculated separately for each of the groups. The injury margins for the two groups were higher than the dumping margins.\n(20)\nTo take into account the risk that, due to their corporate links, the companies with the higher individual dumping margin could channel their exports through the companies with the lower dumping margin, a single weighted average dumping margin was then calculated for both groups and a single duty rate imposed.\n(21)\nThe Commission examined whether the alleged change in the relationship would render the single duty rate to be no longer justified. Subsequently, the Commission examined the need for the review of the individual dumping margins.\n(22)\nThe review investigation revealed that the shares referred to in recital 19 were sold to the owner of the Gani group and the Wonderful group has no longer a stake in the Gani group. There were no indications that the two groups would have any other structural or corporate links. Accordingly, the change of the relationship between the two groups was accepted as claimed and the Gani group and the Wonderful group were considered no longer related for the purposes of specifying the duty.\n(23)\nIt follows that there are no longer reasons for the imposition of a single duty rate. Instead, separate individual duty rates should be assigned to the Gani group and the Wonderful group.\n(24)\nAs to the need for reviewing the individual dumping margins as calculated for each of the groups in the investigation leading to the imposition of the measures in force, the Commission assessed whether the circumstances with regard to the two groups concerned had changed significantly so that it would warrant the review of these individual dumping margins.\n(25)\nThe investigation leading to the imposition of the measures in force established the following:\n(1) they did not share production facilities;\n(2) they did not share sales companies; and\n(3) they did not subcontract for each other.\n(26)\nThe review investigation confirmed that this situation remained unchanged despite the change in relationship.\n(27)\nIn these specific circumstances, the Commission considered that the cessation of the relationship did not change the functioning of each of the the two groups in any way that has a bearing on the calculation of their dumping margins. Therefore, amending these dumping margins on the basis of new calculations is not warranted under Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation.\n(28)\nIn view of the above, the separate dumping margins calculated in the original investigation should be imposed as individual duties. These dumping margins are 13,9 % for the Gani group and 32,0 % for the Wonderful group.\n(29)\nThese findings were disclosed to interested parties and they were given time to comment.\n(30)\nThe Wonderful group first claimed that they had informed the Commission during the verification visit in the People's Republic of China that some of the evidence submitted by the Gani group in the request for review was false or misleading. They pointed out that the Commission has at its disposal Article 18 of the basic Regulation for this type of situation. They also questioned whether the provisions of Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation had been complied with in this respect.\n(31)\nThe Commission has verified all the relevant and duly documented evidence collected during the investigation, which showed that the two groups were no longer related to each other, as well as the evidence with regard to the functioning of each of the two groups, both before and after the cessation of the relationship. This evidence confirms that the group has irrevocably split in two, a fact that is not contested by the Wonderful Group.\n(32)\nOn the basis of these facts, the Commission has no ground for applying Article 18 of the basic Regulation. In addition, these facts confirm that Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation was complied with.\n(33)\nSecondly the Wonderful group questioned whether the provision that ‘the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping established’ in Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation has been complied with, on the grounds that new export prices and analogue country normal values were verified during this investigation.\n(34)\nAs set out in recitals 24 to 27 above, the investigation revealed that the functioning of each of the two groups did not change as a result of the cessation of the relationship. As also explained in the Notice of Initiation, in this case no new dumping margins were required. Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation has been complied with, as the amount of the anti-dumping duty does not exceed the margin of dumping, as established in the original investigation. The fact that new export prices and analogue country normal values were also verified during this investigation does not change this conclusion.\n(35)\nFinally the Wonderful group suggested that ‘giving individual margins to companies which were once related but where that relationship has been ended’ is a dangerous precedent to set and allows for a group of companies to manipulate trade defence measures.\n(36)\nThe Commission disagreed with this suggestion. Every review is carried out on its own merits as established by the investigation and not on speculation, and where companies are not related to each other they are entitled to their own individual duty as set out in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation.\n(37)\nThe Union industry association Cerame-Unie (CET) argued that the end of the shareholding relationship does not mean that the possibility of circumvention via the group with the lowest duty can be eliminated. To illustrate this, CET noted that the timing of the two groups being split coincided with the imposition of provisional measures in the original case, and that the two groups did not discuss a split prior to the initiation of the original case. During the original investigation the groups were related and therefore CET submitted that the Gani group and the Wonderful group had access to each other's data.\n(38)\nHowever CET did not provide any evidence to back up these assumptions. In addition, the Commission is under an obligation to impose individual duties on each of the two groups now as it has been established that they are no longer related to each other. The Commission is not entitled to consider two legally separate company groups as related for the purpose of imposing a single duty rate simply because of the mere possibility that the two groups might collaborate together.\n(39)\nCET argued that if the business operations of the two groups have remained unchanged, as has been disclosed, then the risk of circumvention between the two groups must also have remained unchanged.\n(40)\nThe Commission dismissed this argument. The only reason why the two groups were treated as one in the original investigation was due to the ownership link, and this fact has now disappeared.\n(41)\nCET also noted that the locations of the production facilities of the two companies are relatively close to each other, which would make physical circumvention of the measures relatively simple.\n(42)\nThe Commission dismissed this argument as well. Indeed, there is no legal basis to give unrelated companies the same duty, merely because of the fact that companies are relatively close to each other and therefore circumvention is simpler. It is common in the People's Republic of China to have many producers of a particular product in one city or area.\n(43)\nIn view of the above, the comments received after disclosure did not change the conclusion as set out in recital 28 above. Therefore, the separate dumping margins calculated in the original investigation should be imposed as individual duties. These dumping margins are 13,9 % for the Gani group and 32,0 % for the Wonderful group.\n(44)\nThe measures provided for in this Regulation are in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,\nHAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:",
  "extent": "E+W+S+N.I.",
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f1",
      "text": "OJ L 343, 22.12.2009, p. 51."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f2",
      "text": "Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 917/2011 of 12 September 2011 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty and collecting definitely the provisional duty imposed on imports of ceramic tiles originating in the People's Republic of China (OJ L 238, 15.9.2011, p. 1)."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f3",
      "text": "OJ C 28, 31.1.2014, p. 11."
    }
  ],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2015/409/introduction",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-11-01T14:46:48.436089+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}