{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-regulation-2020-2011/annex-III",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-regulation-2020-2011/annex-III.json",
  "legislation": "eur/2020/2011",
  "legislation_title": "Regulation (EU) 2020/2011 of the European Central Bank of 1 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1409/2013 on payments statistics (ECB/2013/43) (ECB/2020/59)",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/eu-regulation-2020-2011",
  "path": "annex/III",
  "kind": "annex",
  "number": "III",
  "heading": "REPORTING SCHEMES",
  "text": "Cells highlighted in grey represent the reporting requirements. Payment service providers should report Tables 1 to 6 and Table 9; payment system operators should report Tables 7 and 8. There are two versions of Tables 4 and 5, only one of which should be reported. Tables 4a and 5a should be reported by all payment service providers which have not been granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4, whereas reporting agents which have been granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) should report the statistical information in Tables 4b and 5b. The geographical breakdowns are explained in detail at the end of this Annex.\nTable 1 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.\nTable 1\nInstitutions offering payment services to non-monetary financial institutions (non-MFIs)\n(End of period; number in actual units; value in EUR; Geo 0 except when otherwise indicated)\nOutstanding value on e-money storages issued by e-money issuers.\nNumber\nValue\nCredit institutions\nNumber of overnight deposits\nof which:\nNumber of internet/PC-linked overnight deposits\nNumber of transferable overnight deposits\nof which:\nNumber of internet/PC-linked transferable overnight deposits\nNumber of payment accounts\nNumber of e-money accounts\nOutstanding value on e-money storages issued\nAccount Information Services Providers\nNumber of clients\nGeo 3\nElectronic money institutions\nNumber of payment accounts\nNumber of e-money accounts\nOutstanding value on e-money storages issued\nPayment institutions\nNumber of payment accounts\nAccount Information Services Providers\nNumber of Clients\nGeo 3\nOther PSPs and e-money issuers\nNumber of payment accounts\nNumber of e-money accounts\nOutstanding value on e-money storages issued\nAccount Servicing Payment Services Providers\nNumber of payment accounts accessed by Account Information Service Providers\nGeo 3\nTable 2 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.\nTable 2\nCard functions\n(End of period; number in actual units; Geo 0)\nCards issued under each other PCS should be reported separately in the manner required by the NCB.\nCards issued by resident PSPs\nNumber\nCards with a cash function\nCards with a payment function (except cards with an e-money function only)\nof which:\nDebit card\nissued under PCS VISA\nissued under PCS MASTERCARD\nissued under other PCSs\nDelayed debit card\nissued under PCS VISA\nissued under PCS MASTERCARD\nissued under other PCSs2\nCredit card\nissued under PCS VISA\nissued under PCS MASTERCARD\nissued under other PCSs\nCards with an e-money function\nCards on which e-money can be stored directly\nof which:\nCards with an e-money function that have been loaded at least once\nCards which give access to e-money stored on e-money accounts\nTotal number of cards (irrespective of the number of functions on the card)\nof which:\nCards with a combined debit, cash and e-money function\nCards with a contactless payment function\nTable 3 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.\nTable 3\nCard accepting devices\n(End of period; number in actual units; Geo 3)\nTerminals provided by resident PSPs\nNumber\nATMs\nof which:\nATMs with a cash withdrawal function\nATMs with a credit transfer function\nATMs accepting contactless transactions\nPOS terminals\nof which:\nEFTPOS terminals\nof which:\naccepting contactless transactions\naccepting e-money card transactions\nE-money card terminals\nof which:\nE-money card loading and unloading terminals\nE-money card accepting terminals\nTable 4a is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.\nTable 4a\nPayment transactions involving non-MFIs\n(Total for the period; Geo 3 except when otherwise indicated; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions)\nReported for each scheme separately.\nThe reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme.\nSent\nReceived\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nCredit transfers\nCredit transfers (total)\nInitiated in paper-based form\nInitiated electronically\nInitiated in a file/batch\nInitiated on a single payment basis\nof which:\nOnline banking based credit transfer\nof which:\nE-commerce payments\nATM or other PSP terminal\nMobile payment solution\nof which:\nP2P mobile payment solution\nof which:\nProcessed by credit transfer schemes\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nPayment to self\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction Risk Analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nOther\nof which:\nInitiated by PISP\nDirect debits\nDirect debits (total)\nInitiated in a file/batch\nInitiated on a single payment basis\nConsent given via an electronic mandate\nProcessed by direct debit schemes\nConsent given in other forms\nProcessed by direct debit schemes\nCard-based payment transactions\nCard-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs [sent] / acquired by resident PSPs (except cards with an e-money function only) [received]\ninitiated non-electronically\ninitiated electronically\nof which:\nMobile payment solution\nof which:\nP2P mobile payment solution\nInitiated at a physical EFTPOS\nof which:\nContactless payments\nof which:\nNear Field Communication (NFC) payments\nInitiated at an ATM\nOthers\nof which:\nProcessed by payment card schemes\nof which:\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nof which:\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nLow value\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nCash withdrawals\nCash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total)\nProcessed by payment card schemes\nof which:\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nE-money payment transactions\nE-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total)\nWith cards on which e-money can be stored directly\nWith e-money accounts\nof which:\nAccessed through a card\nMobile payment solution\nof which:\nP2P payment solution\nOthers\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nPayment to self\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nCheques\nMoney remittances\nOther payment services\nTotal payment transactions involving non-MFIs\nPayment initiation services\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which broken down by payment instrument:\nCredit transfers\nOther\nOther services (not included in Directive (EU) 2015/2366)\nCredits to the accounts by simple book entry\nGeo_0\nDebits from the accounts by simple book entry\nGeo_0\nOthers\nGeo_0\nTable 4b is reported only by PSPs granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) on an annual basis, with a half-yearly breakdown.\nTable 4b\nPayment transactions involving non-MFIs reported by reporting agents granted a derogation\n(Total for the period, Geo 3, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions)\nSent\nReceived\nTotal\nRemote\nNon -remote\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nCredit transfers\nCredit transfers (total)\nInitiated in paper-based form\nInitiated electronically\nof which:\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nPayment to self\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction Risk Analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nOther\nof which:\nInitiated by PISP\nDirect debits\nDirect debits (total)\nConsent given via an electronic mandate\nConsent given in other forms\nCard-based payment transactions\nCard-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs [sent] / acquired by resident PSPs (except cards with an e-money function only) [received]\ninitiated non-electronically\ninitiated electronically\nof which:\nwith debit card\nwith delayed debit card\nwith credit card\nof which:\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nLow value\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nCash withdrawals\nCash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total)\nof which:\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nE-money payment transactions\nE-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total)\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nPayment to self\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nMoney remittances\nPayment initiation services\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which broken down by payment instrument:\nCredit transfers\nOther\nTable 5a is reported by all PSPs, except those granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.\nTable 5a\nFraudulent payment transactions involving non-MFIs\n(Total for the period; Geo 3, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions) except when otherwise indicated; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions)\nReported for each scheme separately.\nThe reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme.\nOnly reported for the value of fraudulent transactions.\nSent\nReceived\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nFraudulent credit transfers\nFraudulent credit transfers (total)\nInitiated in paper-based form\nInitiated electronically\nInitiated in a file/batch\nInitiated on a single payment basis\nof which:\nOnline banking based credit transfer\nof which:\nE-commerce payments\nATM or other PSP terminal\nMobile payment solution\nof which:\nP2P mobile payment solution\nof which:\nProcessed by credit transfer schemes\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nof which fraudulent credit transfers by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which fraudulent credit transfers by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nPayment to self\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction Risk Analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nOther\nof which:\nInitiated by PISP\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nFraudulent direct debits\nFraudulent direct debits (total)\nInitiated in a file/batch\nInitiated on a single payment basis\nConsent given via an electronic mandate\nProcessed by direct debit schemes\nof which fraudulent direct debits by origin:\nUnauthorised payment transaction\nManipulation of the payer\nConsent given in other forms\nProcessed by direct debit schemes\nof which fraudulent direct debits by origin:\nUnauthorised payment transaction\nManipulation of the payer\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nFraudulent Card-based payment transactions\nFraudulent card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs [sent] / acquired by resident PSP (except cards with an e-money function only) [received]\ninitiated non-electronically\ninitiated electronically\nof which:\nMobile payment solution\nof which:\nP2P mobile payment solution\nInitiated at a physical EFTPOS\nof which:\nContactless payments\nof which:\nNear Field Communication (NFC) payments\nInitiated at an ATM\nOthers\nof which:\nProcessed by payment card schemes\nof which:\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nof which:\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nof which fraudulent card payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or Stolen card\nCard Not Received\nCounterfeit card\nCard details theft\nOthers\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make a card payment\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which fraudulent card payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or Stolen card\nCard Not Received\nCounterfeit card\nCard details theft\nOthers\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make a card payment\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nLow value\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nGeo1\nFraudulent cash withdrawals\nFraudulent cash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total)\nProcessed by payment card schemes\nof which:\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nof which fraudulent cash withdrawal by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order (cash withdrawal) by the fraudster\nLost or stolen card\nCard Not Received\nCounterfeit card\nOther\nManipulation of the payer to make a cash withdrawal\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nFraudulent e-money payment transactions\nFraudulent e-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total)\nWith cards on which e-money can be stored directly\nWith e-money accounts\nof which:\nAccessed through a card\nMobile payment solution\nof which:\nP2P payment solution\nOthers\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nof which fraudulent e-money payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or stolen e-money card\nE-money card not received\nCounterfeit e-money card\nCard details theft\nUnauthorised e-money account transaction\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which fraudulent e-money payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or stolen e-money card\nE-money card not received\nCounterfeit e-money card\nCard details theft\nUnauthorised e-money account transaction\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nPayment to self\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nCheques\nMoney remittances\nOther payment services\nTotal fraudulent payment transactions involving non-MFIs\nPayment initiation services\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which broken down by payment instrument:\nCredit transfers\nOther\nTable 5b is reported only by PSPs granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) on an annual basis, with a half-yearly breakdown.\nTable 5b\nFraudulent payment transactions involving non-MFIs reported by reporting agents granted a derogation\n(Total for the period, Geo 3, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions) except when otherwise indicated, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions)\nOnly reported for the value of fraudulent transactions.\nFor cross-border card-based payment transactions, the residency of the counterpart and the location of the POS are reported together. For card-based payment transactions initiated remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. For card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the physical terminal is located. Received payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. Received payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the physical point of sale is located\nSent\nReceived\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nFraudulent credit transfers\nFraudulent credit transfers (total)\nInitiated in paper-based form\nInitiated electronically\nof which:\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nof which fraudulent credit transfers by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which fraudulent credit transfers by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nPayment to self\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction Risk Analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nOther\nof which:\nInitiated by PISP\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nFraudulent direct debits\nFraudulent direct debits (total)\nConsent given via an electronic mandate\nof which fraudulent direct debits by origin:\nUnauthorised payment transaction\nManipulation of the payer\nConsent given in other forms\nof which fraudulent direct debits by origin:\nUnauthorised payment transaction\nManipulation of the payer\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nFraudulent Card-based payment transactions\nFraudulent card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSP [sent] / acquired by resident PSP (except cards with an e-money function only) [received]\ninitiated non-electronically\ninitiated electronically\nof which:\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nof which:\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nof which fraudulent card payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or Stolen card\nCard Not Received\nCounterfeit card\nCard details theft\nOthers\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make a card payment\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which fraudulent card payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or Stolen card\nCard Not Received\nCounterfeit card\nCard details theft\nOthers\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make a card payment\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nLow value\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nGeo1\nFraudulent cash withdrawals\nFraudulent cash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total)\nwith debit cards\nwith delayed debit cards\nwith credit cards\nof which fraudulent cash withdrawals by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or stolen card\nCard Not Received\nCounterfeit card\nOther\nManipulation of the payer to make a cash withdrawal\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nFraudulent e-money payment transactions\nFraudulent e-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total)\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nof which fraudulent e-money payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or stolen e-money card\nE-money card not received\nCounterfeit e-money card\nCard details theft\nUnauthorised e-money account transaction\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which fraudulent e-money payments by origin:\nIssuance of a payment order by the fraudster\nLost or stolen e-money card\nE-money card not received\nCounterfeit e-money card\nCard details theft\nUnauthorised e-money account transaction\nModification of a payment order by the fraudster\nManipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment\nReason for authentication via non-SCA:\nLow value\nTrusted beneficiaries\nRecurring transaction\nPayment to self\nSecure corporate payment processes and protocols\nTransaction risk analysis\nContactless low value\nUnattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees\nMerchant initiated transactions (MIT)\nOther\nof which losses due to fraud per liability bearer:\nThe reporting PSP\nGeo1\nThe PSU of the reporting PSP\nGeo1\nOthers\nGeo1\nMoney remittances\nPayment initiation services\nAuthenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA)\nAuthenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA)\nof which broken down by payment instrument:\nCredit transfers\nOther\nTable 6 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.\nTable 6\nPayment transactions per type of terminal involving non-MFIs\n(Total for the period; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions; Geo 3 except when otherwise indicated)\nThe geographical (Geo) breakdowns are based on the location of the terminal.\nTransactions per type of terminal\nNumber\nValue\na)\nTransactions at terminals at which transactions are acquired by resident PSPs with cards issued by resident PSPs\nof which:\nATM cash withdrawals (except e-money transactions)\nATM cash deposits (except e-money transactions)\nOther ATM transactions (except e-money transactions)\nPOS transactions (except e-money transactions)\nE-money card loading and unloading transactions\nE-money payment transactions with cards with an e-money function\nb)\nTransactions at terminals at which transactions are acquired by resident PSPs with cards issued by non-resident PSPs\nof which:\nATM cash withdrawals (except e-money transactions)\nATM cash deposits (except e-money transactions)\nOther ATM transactions (except e-money transactions)\nPOS transactions (except e-money transactions)\nE-money card loading and unloading transactions\nE-money payment transactions with cards with an e-money function\nc)\nTransactions at terminals at which transactions are acquired by non-resident PSPs with cards issued by resident PSPs\nof which:\nATM cash withdrawals (except e-money transactions)\nATM cash deposits (except e-money transactions)\nOther ATM transactions (except e-money transactions)\nPOS transactions (except e-money transactions)\nE-money card loading and unloading transactions\nE-money payment transactions with cards with an e-money function\nOTC cash withdrawals\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nOTC cash deposits\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nCash advances at POS terminals\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nTable 7 is reported by payment system operators.\nTable 7\nParticipation in selected payment systems\n(End of period; number in actual units; Geo 1)\nPayment system (other than TARGET2)\nNumber\nNumber of participants\nDirect participants\nCredit institutions\nCentral bank\nOther direct participants\nGeneral Government\nClearing and settlement organisations\nOther financial institutions\nOthers\nIndirect participants\nTable 8 is reported by payment system operators.\nTable 8\nPayments processed by selected payment systems\n(Total for the period; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions; Geo 4 except when otherwise indicated)\nSent\nNumber\nValue\nPayment system (other than TARGET2) – Large value payments system\nTotal transactions\nCredit transfers\nInitiated in paper-based form\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nInitiated electronically\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nDirect debits\nCard-based payment transactions\nATM cash withdrawals\nATM cash deposits\nE-money payment transactions\nCheques\nOther payment services\nConcentration ratio\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nPayment system (other than TARGET2) – Retail payments system\nTotal transactions\nCredit transfers\nInitiated in paper-based form\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nInitiated electronically\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nof which:\nInstant\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nDirect debits\nCard-based payment transactions\nATM cash withdrawals\nATM cash deposits\nE-money payment transactions\nCheques\nOther payment services\nConcentration ratio\nGeo 1\nGeo 1\nTable 9 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a quarterly basis.\nTable 9\nQuarterly reporting of payment transactions involving non-MFIs\n(Total for the period; Geo 6; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions)\nCross-border card-based payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country in which the point of sale is located, while cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country in which the physical terminal is located.\nSent\nTotal\nRemote\nNon-remote\nCredit transfers\nCredit transfers (total)\nInitiated electronically\nDirect debits\nDirect debits (total)\nCard-based payment transactions\nCard-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs (except cards with an e-money function only) [sent]\nInitiated electronically\nof which:\nMCC\nE-money payment transactions\nE-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total)\nCheques\nGeographical breakdowns\nBased on ISO 3166:https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search\nGeo 0\nGeo 1\nGeo 2\nGeo 3\nGeo 4\nGeo 6\nDomestic\nDomestic and cross-border combined\nCross-border\nDomestic\nDomestic\nSingle country breakdown for all countries\nSingle country breakdown for each EEA member\nCross-border within the EEA\nRest of the world (cross-border outside the EEA)\nRest of the world (cross-border outside the EEA)",
  "extent": "E+W+S+N.I.",
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f1",
      "text": "Outstanding value on e-money storages issued by e-money issuers."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f2",
      "text": "Cards issued under each other PCS should be reported separately in the manner required by the NCB."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f3",
      "text": "For cross-border card-based payment transactions, the residency of the counterpart and the location of the POS are reported together. For card-based payment transactions initiated remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. For card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the physical terminal is located. Received payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. Received payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the physical point of sale is located"
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f4",
      "text": "Reported for each scheme separately."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f5",
      "text": "The reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f6",
      "text": "Reported for each scheme separately."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f7",
      "text": "The reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f8",
      "text": "Only reported for the value of fraudulent transactions."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f9",
      "text": "Only reported for the value of fraudulent transactions."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f10",
      "text": "The geographical (Geo) breakdowns are based on the location of the terminal."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f11",
      "text": "Cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country in which the point of sale is located, while cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country in which the physical terminal is located."
    },
    {
      "type": "footnote",
      "label": "f12",
      "text": "Based on ISO 3166:https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search"
    }
  ],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2020/2011/annex/III",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-11-01T14:42:15.323667+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}