{
  "url": "https://openlegislation.uk/sanctions-eu-exit-miscellaneous-amendments-regulations-2026/note",
  "json_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/sanctions-eu-exit-miscellaneous-amendments-regulations-2026/note.json",
  "legislation": "uksi/2026/443",
  "legislation_title": "The Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026",
  "legislation_url": "https://openlegislation.uk/sanctions-eu-exit-miscellaneous-amendments-regulations-2026",
  "path": "note",
  "kind": "note",
  "number": null,
  "heading": "Explanatory note",
  "text": "(This note is not part of the Regulations)\nThese Regulations are made under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (c. 13) (“the Sanctions Act”).\nThe Regulations make amendments to a number of sanctions regulations which have been made under section 1 of the Sanctions Act.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to broaden the scope of the prior obligations licensing ground; namely—\nthe Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/135),\nthe Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/411),\nthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/433),\nthe South Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/438),\nthe Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/461),\nthe Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/554),\nthe Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/600),\nthe Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/604),\nthe Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/618),\nthe Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/792),\nthe Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/855),\nthe Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/1145),\nthe Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/597),\nthe Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/608),\nthe Nicaragua (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/610),\nthe Central African Republic (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/616),\nthe Somalia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/642),\nthe Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/680),\nthe Mali (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/705),\nthe Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/753),\nthe Yemen (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1278),\nthe Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1474),\nthe Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1665),\nthe Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021 (S.I. 2021/488),\nthe Myanmar (Sanctions) Regulations 2021 (S.I. 2021/496),\nthe Haiti (Sanctions) Regulations 2022 (S.I. 2022/1281),\nthe Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023 (S.I. 2023/1314), and\nthe Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025 (S.I. 2025/902).\nThe Regulations amend the Afghanistan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/948) to remove the prior obligations licensing ground in line with the relevant UN obligations, and to correct an error contained in the amending S.I. 2024/644.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to create an offence of exporting controlled goods having been informed of the risk of diversion; namely—\nthe Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Lebanon (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/612),\nthe Somalia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Myanmar (Sanctions) Regulations 2021, and\nthe Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to remove defunct wording following the amendment of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2) by section 32 of the Finance Act 2024 (c. 3); namely—\nthe Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe South Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/466),\nthe Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/573),\nthe Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Lebanon (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Central African Republic (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Somalia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Iraq (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/707),\nthe Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Afghanistan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Syria (United Nations Sanctions) (Cultural Property) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1233),\nthe Yemen (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2020,\nthe Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Myanmar (Sanctions) Regulations 2021,\nthe Haiti (Sanctions) Regulations 2022, and\nthe Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to change currency references from euros to pounds where such references appear in the definitions of “relevant firms”. The definitions of “high value dealers” and “art market participants” will therefore contain monetary thresholds that align with the monetary thresholds for “high value dealers” and “art market participants” as defined in the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations ( S.I. 2017/692), as will be amended by the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2026, which have been laid in draft before Parliament under section 55(5)(d) of the Sanctions Act 2018, and are available at https://www.legislation.gov.uk; namely—\nthe Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe South Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/577),\nthe Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Nicaragua (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Central African Republic (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Lebanon (Sanctions) (Assassination of Rafiq Hariri and others) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/617),\nthe Somalia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020,\nthe Mali (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Iraq (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Afghanistan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Yemen (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2020,\nthe Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021,\nthe Myanmar (Sanctions) Regulations 2021,\nthe Haiti (Sanctions) Regulations 2022,\nIran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023, and\nthe Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to remove the requirement for consent to licensing notification by non-postal means; namely—\nthe Venezuela (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe South Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (United Nations Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Republic of Guinea-Bissau (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Counter-Terrorism (International Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Counter-Terrorism (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Guinea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Cyber (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Nicaragua (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Lebanon (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Central African Republic (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Lebanon (Sanctions) (Assassination of Rafiq Hariri and others) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Somalia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020,\nthe Mali (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Iraq (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Afghanistan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Unauthorised Drilling Activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021,\nthe Myanmar (Sanctions) Regulations 2021,\nthe Haiti (Sanctions) Regulations 2022,\nthe Iran (Sanctions) Regulations 2023, and\nthe Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to clarify the scope of the exception for payments in respect of Treasury debts; namely—\nthe South Sudan (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Iran (Sanctions) (Nuclear) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019,\nthe Central African Republic (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020,\nthe Yemen (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (No. 2) Regulations 2020,\nthe Libya (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020, and\nthe Haiti (Sanctions) Regulations 2022.\nThe Regulations amend the following sanctions regulations to reflect amendments to the Sanctions Act made by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 (c. 10) on the face of the Sanctions Act; namely—\nthe Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, and\nthe Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.\nThe Regulations amend the Zimbabwe (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 to correct an error contained in the amending S.I. 2025/394.\nA full impact assessment has not been produced for this instrument as no, or no significant, impact on the private, voluntary or public sectors is foreseen. An Impact Assessment was, however, produced for the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 and can be found at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/653271/Sanctions_and_Anti-Money_Laundering_Bill_Impact_Assessment_18102017.pdf.",
  "extent": null,
  "status": null,
  "version": "current",
  "annotations": [],
  "outstanding_effects": [],
  "provenance": {
    "source": "legislation.gov.uk",
    "source_url": "https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/443/note",
    "retrieved_at": "2026-10-28T21:02:20.897437+00:00"
  },
  "licence": "Open Government Licence v3.0",
  "licence_url": "https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3/",
  "attribution": "Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0. Source: legislation.gov.uk, The National Archives."
}