The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (Commencement No. 7 and Transitional Provision) Order 2018
S.I. 2018/732 · Made 7 June 2018
Immigration
Supreme Court Of The United Kingdom
Made 7th June 2018
The Lord Chancellor, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 95(1) and (6)(b) of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015f1, makes the following Order.
Annotations to the whole text
Footnotes
- f1
Contents
- 1Citation and interpretation
- 2Commencement of section 6 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015
- 3Transitional provision
- Signature
- Explanatory note
1Citation and interpretation
This Order may be cited as the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (Commencement No. 7 and Transitional Provision) Order 2018.
In this Order, “the Act” means the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.
2Commencement of section 6 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015
Section 66 of the Act (appeals from the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to the Supreme Court) comes into force on the twenty-first day after the day on which this Order is made.
3Transitional provision
The amendments made by section 66 of the Act do not apply in relation to a final determination of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission made before the twenty-first day after the day on which this Order is made.
Signature
Lucy Frazer
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
Ministry of Justice
7th June 2018
Explanatory note
(This note is not part of the Order)
This Order is the seventh commencement order made under the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 (c. 2) (“the Act”).
Article 2 brings into force section 66 of the Act, which amends the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (c. 68) to make provision for appeals (known as “leapfrog” appeals) from final determinations of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“the Commission”) to the Supreme Court if certain conditions are met.
Article 3 provides that amendments made by section 66 of the Act do not apply to a final determination made by the Commission before section 66 comes into force, so that only final determinations made on or after that date may be the subject of a “leapfrog” appeal.