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Division (18) In the Article 6(1)(c) Decision it was argued that the merger could theoretically lead to non-coordinated as well as coordinated effects. As regards non-coordinated effects, the Commission identified three theories of harm which it considered prima facie plausible. In addition to assessing the risk for coordinated effects, the Commission focused its in-depth investigation of non-coordinated effects on assessing whether:

United Kingdom

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  1. (i)

    the merger would allow the parties to use their strong market position downstream vis à vis TAs in order to increase prices vis à vis TSPs upstream (vertical cross market effects);

  2. (ii)

    the merger would eliminate Worldspan as the alleged ‘pricing Maverick’ and therefore lead to post-merger price increases;

  3. (iii)

    the merger would allow the parties to exploit their post-merger market power vis à vis TAs in Member States in which Galileo/Worldspan would have high market shares.