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Commission Decision of 21 August 2007 declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case COMP/M.4523 — Travelport/Worldspan) (notified under document number C(2007) 3938) (Only the English text is authentic) (Text with EEA relevance) (2007/781/EC)

EU Decision 2007/781 · Adopted 21 August 2007 · Extends to United Kingdom

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Commission Decision

of 21 August 2007

declaring a concentration compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement

(Case COMP/M.4523 — Travelport/Worldspan)

(notified under document number C(2007) 3938)

(Only the English text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2007/781/EC)

On 21 August 2007 the Commission adopted a Decision in a merger case under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakingsf1, and in particular Article 8(1) of that Regulation. A non-confidential version of the full decision can be found in the authentic language of the case and in the working languages of the Commission on the website of the Directorate-General for Competition, at the following address: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/index_en.html

Annotations to the whole text

Footnotes

f1

OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

Contents

  1. SUMMARY
  2. (1)Division (1)
  3. (2)Division (2)
  4. (3)Division (3)
  5. (4)Division (4)
  6. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
  7. Relevant Product Market and Possible Alternative Market Definitions
  8. (5)Division (5)
  9. (6)Division (6)
  10. (7)Division (7)
  11. (8)Division (8)
  12. (9)Division (9)
  13. (10)Division (10)
  14. (11)Division (11)
  15. (12)Division (12)
  16. (13)Division (13)
  17. (14)Division (14)
  18. Relevant Geographic Markets
  19. (15)Division (15)
  20. (16)Division (16)
  21. Competitive Assessment of theories of harm
  22. The theories of harm
  23. (17)Division (17)
  24. (18)In the Article 6(1)(c) Decision it was argued that the merger could theoretically lead to non-coordinated as well as coordinated effects. As regards non-coordinated effects, the Commission identified three theories of harm which it considered prima facie plausible. In addition to assessing the risk for coordinated effects, the Commission focused its in-depth investigation of non-coordinated effects on assessing whether:
  25. Vertical cross-market effects (multi-homing vs. single-homing)
  26. (19)Division (19)
  27. (20)Division (20)
  28. (21)Division (21)
  29. (22)Division (22)
  30. (23)Division (23)
  31. (24)Division (24)
  32. (25)Division (25)
  33. Impact of the merger
  34. (26)Division (26)
  35. (27)Division (27)
  36. (28)Division (28)
  37. (29)Division (29)
  38. (30)Division (30)
  39. Loss of Worldspan as ‘pricing maverick’
  40. (31)Division (31)
  41. (32)Division (32)
  42. Worldspan is not charging lower prices
  43. (33)Division (33)
  44. (34)Division (34)
  45. Worldspan has lost market share
  46. (35)Division (35)
  47. (36)Division (36)
  48. (37)Division (37)
  49. Galileo/Worldspan are not each others' closest competitors
  50. (38)Division (38)
  51. (39)Division (39)
  52. There are no incentives for Worldspan to increase its prices post-merger and align them to Galileo's prices
  53. (40)Division (40)
  54. (41)Division (41)
  55. (42)Division (42)
  56. Very large market shares of the parties on the downstream side of the market
  57. (43)As regards the downstream side of the market, the transaction would lead to high market shares (above 40 %) in six Member States, with significant increments. In these six Member States the market shares in 2006 range from (40 to 50 %) to (70 to 80 %).
  58. (44)Division (44)
  59. (45)Division (45)
  60. Downward trend of Galileo's market share
  61. (46)Division (46)
  62. (47)Division (47)
  63. (48)Division (48)
  64. (49)Division (49)
  65. (50)Division (50)
  66. Switching costs
  67. (51)Division (51)
  68. (52)Division (52)
  69. (53)Division (53)
  70. (54)Division (54)
  71. (55)Division (55)
  72. Coordinated effects
  73. (56)Division (56)
  74. Upstream
  75. Reaching terms of coordination
  76. (57)Division (57)
  77. (58)Division (58)
  78. (59)Division (59)
  79. (60)Division (60)
  80. Monitoring of deviations
  81. (61)Division (61)
  82. (62)Division (62)
  83. (63)Division (63)
  84. (64)Division (64)
  85. (65)Division (65)
  86. Deterrent mechanisms
  87. (66)Division (66)
  88. (67)Division (67)
  89. (68)Division (68)
  90. (69)Division (69)
  91. Reactions of outsiders
  92. (70)Division (70)
  93. (71)Division (71)
  94. (72)Division (72)
  95. Downstream
  96. Reaching terms of coordination
  97. (73)Division (73)
  98. (74)Division (74)
  99. (75)Division (75)
  100. Monitoring of deviations
  101. (76)Division (76)
  102. (77)Division (77)
  103. Deterrent mechanisms
  104. (78)Division (78)
  105. Reactions of outsiders
  106. (79)Division (79)
  107. (80)Division (80)
  108. CONCLUSION
  109. (81)Division (81)