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Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1303 of 14 July 2020 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the criteria that ESMA should take into account to determine whether a central counterparty established in a third country is systemically important or likely to become systemically important for the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States (Text with EEA relevance) (revoked)

EU Regulation 2020/1303 · Adopted 14 July 2020 · Extends to United Kingdom

Original text. legislation.gov.uk does not revise this item, so later amendments are not shown here. Changes made to it are listed under each provision when known.

Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2020/1303

of 14 July 2020

supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to the criteria that ESMA should take into account to determine whether a central counterparty established in a third country is systemically important or likely to become systemically important for the financial stability of the Union or of one or more of its Member States

(Text with EEA relevance) (revoked)

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Annotations to the whole text

Textual amendments

F1

Regulation revoked (31.12.2020) by virtue of S.I. 2018/1184, reg. 9A (as inserted by The Securities Financing Transactions, Securitisation and Miscellaneous Amendments (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/1385), regs. 1(4), 44(3))

Contents

  1. 1The nature, size and complexity of the CCP’s business Repealed
  2. 2The effect of failure of or a disruption to a CCP Repealed
  3. 3The CCP’s clearing membership structure Repealed
  4. 4Alternative clearing services provided by other CCPs Repealed
  5. 5The CCP’s relationship, interdependencies, or other interactions Repealed
  6. 6Indicators of minimum exposure of clearing members and clients established in the Union to the CCP Repealed
  7. 7Entry into force Repealed
  8. Signature

1The nature, size and complexity of the CCP’s businessF1

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2The effect of failure of or a disruption to a CCPF1

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3The CCP’s clearing membership structureF1

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4Alternative clearing services provided by other CCPsF1

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5The CCP’s relationship, interdependencies, or other interactionsF1

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6Indicators of minimum exposure of clearing members and clients established in the Union to the CCPF1

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7Entry into forceF1

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Signature

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