Annex III REPORTING SCHEMES
United Kingdom
Cells highlighted in grey represent the reporting requirements. Payment service providers should report Tables 1 to 6 and Table 9; payment system operators should report Tables 7 and 8. There are two versions of Tables 4 and 5, only one of which should be reported. Tables 4a and 5a should be reported by all payment service providers which have not been granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4, whereas reporting agents which have been granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) should report the statistical information in Tables 4b and 5b. The geographical breakdowns are explained in detail at the end of this Annex.
Table 1 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.
Table 1
Institutions offering payment services to non-monetary financial institutions (non-MFIs)
(End of period; number in actual units; value in EUR; Geo 0 except when otherwise indicated)
| Outstanding value on e-money storages issued by e-money issuers. | ||
| Number | Value | |
|---|---|---|
| Credit institutions | ||
| Number of overnight deposits | ||
| of which: | ||
| Number of internet/PC-linked overnight deposits | ||
| Number of transferable overnight deposits | ||
| of which: | ||
| Number of internet/PC-linked transferable overnight deposits | ||
| Number of payment accounts | ||
| Number of e-money accounts | ||
| Outstanding value on e-money storages issuedf1 | ||
| Account Information Services Providers | ||
| Number of clients | Geo 3 | |
| Electronic money institutions | ||
| Number of payment accounts | ||
| Number of e-money accounts | ||
| Outstanding value on e-money storages issued | ||
| Payment institutions | ||
| Number of payment accounts | ||
| Account Information Services Providers | ||
| Number of Clients | Geo 3 | |
| Other PSPs and e-money issuers | ||
| Number of payment accounts | ||
| Number of e-money accounts | ||
| Outstanding value on e-money storages issued | ||
| Account Servicing Payment Services Providers | ||
| Number of payment accounts accessed by Account Information Service Providers | Geo 3 | |
Table 2 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.
Table 2
Card functions
(End of period; number in actual units; Geo 0)
| Cards issued under each other PCS should be reported separately in the manner required by the NCB. | |
| Cards issued by resident PSPs | Number |
|---|---|
| Cards with a cash function | |
| Cards with a payment function (except cards with an e-money function only) | |
| of which: | |
| Debit card | |
| issued under PCS VISA | |
| issued under PCS MASTERCARD | |
| issued under other PCSsf2 | |
| Delayed debit card | |
| issued under PCS VISA | |
| issued under PCS MASTERCARD | |
| issued under other PCSs2 | |
| Credit card | |
| issued under PCS VISA | |
| issued under PCS MASTERCARD | |
| issued under other PCSs | |
| Cards with an e-money function | |
| Cards on which e-money can be stored directly | |
| of which: | |
| Cards with an e-money function that have been loaded at least once | |
| Cards which give access to e-money stored on e-money accounts | |
| Total number of cards (irrespective of the number of functions on the card) | |
| of which: | |
| Cards with a combined debit, cash and e-money function | |
| Cards with a contactless payment function | |
Table 3 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.
Table 3
Card accepting devices
(End of period; number in actual units; Geo 3)
| Terminals provided by resident PSPs | Number |
|---|---|
| ATMs | |
| of which: | |
| ATMs with a cash withdrawal function | |
| ATMs with a credit transfer function | |
| ATMs accepting contactless transactions | |
| POS terminals | |
| of which: | |
| EFTPOS terminals | |
| of which: | |
| accepting contactless transactions | |
| accepting e-money card transactions | |
| E-money card terminals | |
| of which: | |
| E-money card loading and unloading terminals | |
| E-money card accepting terminals |
Table 4a is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.
Table 4a
Payment transactions involving non-MFIs
(Total for the period; Geo 3f3 except when otherwise indicated; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions)
| Reported for each scheme separately. | ||||||
| The reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme. | ||||||
| Sent | Received | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Remote | Non-remote | Total | Remote | Non-remote | |
| Credit transfers | ||||||
| Credit transfers (total) | ||||||
| Initiated in paper-based form | ||||||
| Initiated electronically | ||||||
| Initiated in a file/batch | ||||||
| Initiated on a single payment basis | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Online banking based credit transfer | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| E-commerce payments | ||||||
| ATM or other PSP terminal | ||||||
| Mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| P2P mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Processed by credit transfer schemesf4 | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCAf5: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction Risk Analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Initiated by PISP | ||||||
| Direct debits | ||||||
| Direct debits (total) | ||||||
| Initiated in a file/batch | ||||||
| Initiated on a single payment basis | ||||||
| Consent given via an electronic mandate | ||||||
| Processed by direct debit schemes | ||||||
| Consent given in other forms | ||||||
| Processed by direct debit schemes | ||||||
| Card-based payment transactions | ||||||
| Card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs [sent] / acquired by resident PSPs (except cards with an e-money function only) [received] | ||||||
| initiated non-electronically | ||||||
| initiated electronically | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| P2P mobile payment solution | ||||||
| Initiated at a physical EFTPOS | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Contactless payments | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Near Field Communication (NFC) payments | ||||||
| Initiated at an ATM | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Processed by payment card schemes | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Cash withdrawals | ||||||
| Cash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total) | ||||||
| Processed by payment card schemes | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| E-money payment transactions | ||||||
| E-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total) | ||||||
| With cards on which e-money can be stored directly | ||||||
| With e-money accounts | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Accessed through a card | ||||||
| Mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| P2P payment solution | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Cheques | ||||||
| Money remittances | ||||||
| Other payment services | ||||||
| Total payment transactions involving non-MFIs | ||||||
| Payment initiation services | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which broken down by payment instrument: | ||||||
| Credit transfers | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Other services (not included in Directive (EU) 2015/2366) | ||||||
| Credits to the accounts by simple book entry | Geo_0 | |||||
| Debits from the accounts by simple book entry | Geo_0 | |||||
| Others | Geo_0 | |||||
Table 4b is reported only by PSPs granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) on an annual basis, with a half-yearly breakdown.
Table 4b
Payment transactions involving non-MFIs reported by reporting agents granted a derogation
(Total for the period, Geo 3, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions)
| Sent | Received | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Remote | Non -remote | Total | Remote | Non-remote | |
| Credit transfers | ||||||
| Credit transfers (total) | ||||||
| Initiated in paper-based form | ||||||
| Initiated electronically | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction Risk Analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Initiated by PISP | ||||||
| Direct debits | ||||||
| Direct debits (total) | ||||||
| Consent given via an electronic mandate | ||||||
| Consent given in other forms | ||||||
| Card-based payment transactions | ||||||
| Card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs [sent] / acquired by resident PSPs (except cards with an e-money function only) [received] | ||||||
| initiated non-electronically | ||||||
| initiated electronically | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit card | ||||||
| with delayed debit card | ||||||
| with credit card | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Cash withdrawals | ||||||
| Cash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total) | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| E-money payment transactions | ||||||
| E-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total) | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Money remittances | ||||||
| Payment initiation services | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which broken down by payment instrument: | ||||||
| Credit transfers | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
Table 5a is reported by all PSPs, except those granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.
Table 5a
Fraudulent payment transactions involving non-MFIs
(Total for the period; Geo 3, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions) except when otherwise indicated; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions)
| Reported for each scheme separately. | ||||||
| The reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme. | ||||||
| Only reported for the value of fraudulent transactions. | ||||||
| Sent | Received | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Remote | Non-remote | Total | Remote | Non-remote | |
| Fraudulent credit transfers | ||||||
| Fraudulent credit transfers (total) | ||||||
| Initiated in paper-based form | ||||||
| Initiated electronically | ||||||
| Initiated in a file/batch | ||||||
| Initiated on a single payment basis | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Online banking based credit transfer | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| E-commerce payments | ||||||
| ATM or other PSP terminal | ||||||
| Mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| P2P mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Processed by credit transfer schemesf6 | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent credit transfers by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent credit transfers by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCAf7: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction Risk Analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Initiated by PISP | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: f8 | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Fraudulent direct debits | ||||||
| Fraudulent direct debits (total) | ||||||
| Initiated in a file/batch | ||||||
| Initiated on a single payment basis | ||||||
| Consent given via an electronic mandate | ||||||
| Processed by direct debit schemes | ||||||
| of which fraudulent direct debits by origin: | ||||||
| Unauthorised payment transaction | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer | ||||||
| Consent given in other forms | ||||||
| Processed by direct debit schemes | ||||||
| of which fraudulent direct debits by origin: | ||||||
| Unauthorised payment transaction | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Fraudulent Card-based payment transactions | ||||||
| Fraudulent card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs [sent] / acquired by resident PSP (except cards with an e-money function only) [received] | ||||||
| initiated non-electronically | ||||||
| initiated electronically | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| P2P mobile payment solution | ||||||
| Initiated at a physical EFTPOS | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Contactless payments | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Near Field Communication (NFC) payments | ||||||
| Initiated at an ATM | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Processed by payment card schemes | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent card payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or Stolen card | ||||||
| Card Not Received | ||||||
| Counterfeit card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent card payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or Stolen card | ||||||
| Card Not Received | ||||||
| Counterfeit card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | Geo1 | ||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | Geo1 | ||||
| Others | Geo1 | Geo1 | ||||
| Fraudulent cash withdrawals | ||||||
| Fraudulent cash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total) | ||||||
| Processed by payment card schemes | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| of which fraudulent cash withdrawal by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order (cash withdrawal) by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or stolen card | ||||||
| Card Not Received | ||||||
| Counterfeit card | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make a cash withdrawal | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Fraudulent e-money payment transactions | ||||||
| Fraudulent e-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total) | ||||||
| With cards on which e-money can be stored directly | ||||||
| With e-money accounts | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Accessed through a card | ||||||
| Mobile payment solution | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| P2P payment solution | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent e-money payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or stolen e-money card | ||||||
| E-money card not received | ||||||
| Counterfeit e-money card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Unauthorised e-money account transaction | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent e-money payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or stolen e-money card | ||||||
| E-money card not received | ||||||
| Counterfeit e-money card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Unauthorised e-money account transaction | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Cheques | ||||||
| Money remittances | ||||||
| Other payment services | ||||||
| Total fraudulent payment transactions involving non-MFIs | ||||||
| Payment initiation services | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which broken down by payment instrument: | ||||||
| Credit transfers | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
Table 5b is reported only by PSPs granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3) on an annual basis, with a half-yearly breakdown.
Table 5b
Fraudulent payment transactions involving non-MFIs reported by reporting agents granted a derogation
(Total for the period, Geo 3, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions) except when otherwise indicated, number of transactions in millions, value of transactions in EUR millions)
| Only reported for the value of fraudulent transactions. | ||||||
| For cross-border card-based payment transactions, the residency of the counterpart and the location of the POS are reported together. For card-based payment transactions initiated remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. For card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the physical terminal is located. Received payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. Received payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the physical point of sale is located | ||||||
| Sent | Received | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Remote | Non-remote | Total | Remote | Non-remote | |
| Fraudulent credit transfers | ||||||
| Fraudulent credit transfers (total) | ||||||
| Initiated in paper-based form | ||||||
| Initiated electronically | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent credit transfers by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent credit transfers by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer by the fraudster to issue a payment order | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction Risk Analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Initiated by PISP | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: f9 | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Fraudulent direct debits | ||||||
| Fraudulent direct debits (total) | ||||||
| Consent given via an electronic mandate | ||||||
| of which fraudulent direct debits by origin: | ||||||
| Unauthorised payment transaction | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer | ||||||
| Consent given in other forms | ||||||
| of which fraudulent direct debits by origin: | ||||||
| Unauthorised payment transaction | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Fraudulent Card-based payment transactions | ||||||
| Fraudulent card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSP [sent] / acquired by resident PSP (except cards with an e-money function only) [received] | ||||||
| initiated non-electronically | ||||||
| initiated electronically | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| of which: | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent card payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or Stolen card | ||||||
| Card Not Received | ||||||
| Counterfeit card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent card payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or Stolen card | ||||||
| Card Not Received | ||||||
| Counterfeit card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Others | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make a card payment | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | Geo1 | ||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | Geo1 | ||||
| Others | Geo1 | Geo1 | ||||
| Fraudulent cash withdrawals | ||||||
| Fraudulent cash withdrawals using card-based payment instruments (except e-money transactions) (total) | ||||||
| with debit cards | ||||||
| with delayed debit cards | ||||||
| with credit cards | ||||||
| of which fraudulent cash withdrawals by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or stolen card | ||||||
| Card Not Received | ||||||
| Counterfeit card | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make a cash withdrawal | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Fraudulent e-money payment transactions | ||||||
| Fraudulent e-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total) | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent e-money payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or stolen e-money card | ||||||
| E-money card not received | ||||||
| Counterfeit e-money card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Unauthorised e-money account transaction | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which fraudulent e-money payments by origin: | ||||||
| Issuance of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Lost or stolen e-money card | ||||||
| E-money card not received | ||||||
| Counterfeit e-money card | ||||||
| Card details theft | ||||||
| Unauthorised e-money account transaction | ||||||
| Modification of a payment order by the fraudster | ||||||
| Manipulation of the payer to make an e-money payment | ||||||
| Reason for authentication via non-SCA: | ||||||
| Low value | ||||||
| Trusted beneficiaries | ||||||
| Recurring transaction | ||||||
| Payment to self | ||||||
| Secure corporate payment processes and protocols | ||||||
| Transaction risk analysis | ||||||
| Contactless low value | ||||||
| Unattended terminals for transport fares or parking fees | ||||||
| Merchant initiated transactions (MIT) | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
| of which losses due to fraud per liability bearer: | ||||||
| The reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| The PSU of the reporting PSP | Geo1 | |||||
| Others | Geo1 | |||||
| Money remittances | ||||||
| Payment initiation services | ||||||
| Authenticated via strong customer authentication (SCA) | ||||||
| Authenticated via non-strong customer authentication (non-SCA) | ||||||
| of which broken down by payment instrument: | ||||||
| Credit transfers | ||||||
| Other | ||||||
Table 6 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a semi-annual basis.
Table 6
Payment transactions per type of terminal involving non-MFIs
(Total for the period; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions; Geo 3 except when otherwise indicated)
| The geographical (Geo) breakdowns are based on the location of the terminal. | |||
| Transactions per type of terminalf10 | Number | Value | |
|---|---|---|---|
| a) | Transactions at terminals at which transactions are acquired by resident PSPs with cards issued by resident PSPs | ||
| of which: | |||
| ATM cash withdrawals (except e-money transactions) | |||
| ATM cash deposits (except e-money transactions) | |||
| Other ATM transactions (except e-money transactions) | |||
| POS transactions (except e-money transactions) | |||
| E-money card loading and unloading transactions | |||
| E-money payment transactions with cards with an e-money function | |||
| b) | Transactions at terminals at which transactions are acquired by resident PSPs with cards issued by non-resident PSPs | ||
| of which: | |||
| ATM cash withdrawals (except e-money transactions) | |||
| ATM cash deposits (except e-money transactions) | |||
| Other ATM transactions (except e-money transactions) | |||
| POS transactions (except e-money transactions) | |||
| E-money card loading and unloading transactions | |||
| E-money payment transactions with cards with an e-money function | |||
| c) | Transactions at terminals at which transactions are acquired by non-resident PSPs with cards issued by resident PSPs | ||
| of which: | |||
| ATM cash withdrawals (except e-money transactions) | |||
| ATM cash deposits (except e-money transactions) | |||
| Other ATM transactions (except e-money transactions) | |||
| POS transactions (except e-money transactions) | |||
| E-money card loading and unloading transactions | |||
| E-money payment transactions with cards with an e-money function | |||
| OTC cash withdrawals | Geo 1 | Geo 1 | |
| OTC cash deposits | Geo 1 | Geo 1 | |
| Cash advances at POS terminals | Geo 1 | Geo 1 | |
Table 7 is reported by payment system operators.
Table 7
Participation in selected payment systems
(End of period; number in actual units; Geo 1)
| Payment system (other than TARGET2) | Number |
|---|---|
| Number of participants | |
| Direct participants | |
| Credit institutions | |
| Central bank | |
| Other direct participants | |
| General Government | |
| Clearing and settlement organisations | |
| Other financial institutions | |
| Others | |
| Indirect participants |
Table 8 is reported by payment system operators.
Table 8
Payments processed by selected payment systems
(Total for the period; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions; Geo 4 except when otherwise indicated)
| Sent | ||
|---|---|---|
| Number | Value | |
| Payment system (other than TARGET2) – Large value payments system | ||
| Total transactions | ||
| Credit transfers | ||
| Initiated in paper-based form | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
| Initiated electronically | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
| Direct debits | ||
| Card-based payment transactions | ||
| ATM cash withdrawals | ||
| ATM cash deposits | ||
| E-money payment transactions | ||
| Cheques | ||
| Other payment services | ||
| Concentration ratio | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
| Payment system (other than TARGET2) – Retail payments system | ||
| Total transactions | ||
| Credit transfers | ||
| Initiated in paper-based form | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
| Initiated electronically | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
| of which: | ||
| Instant | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
| Direct debits | ||
| Card-based payment transactions | ||
| ATM cash withdrawals | ||
| ATM cash deposits | ||
| E-money payment transactions | ||
| Cheques | ||
| Other payment services | ||
| Concentration ratio | Geo 1 | Geo 1 |
Table 9 is reported by all PSPs, except those granted a derogation pursuant to Article 4(2) and (3), on a quarterly basis.
Table 9
Quarterly reporting of payment transactions involving non-MFIs
(Total for the period; Geo 6f11; number of transactions in millions; value of transactions in EUR millions)
| Cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country in which the point of sale is located, while cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country in which the physical terminal is located. | |||
| Sent | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Total | Remote | Non-remote | |
| Credit transfers | |||
| Credit transfers (total) | |||
| Initiated electronically | |||
| Direct debits | |||
| Direct debits (total) | |||
| Card-based payment transactions | |||
| Card-based payment transactions with card-based payment instruments issued by resident PSPs (except cards with an e-money function only) [sent] | |||
| Initiated electronically | |||
| of which: | |||
| MCC | |||
| E-money payment transactions | |||
| E-money payment transactions with e-money issued by resident PSPs (total) | |||
| Cheques | |||
Geographical breakdowns
| Based on ISO 3166:https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search | |||||
| Geo 0 | Geo 1 | Geo 2 | Geo 3 | Geo 4 | Geo 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic | Domestic and cross-border combined | Cross-border | Domestic | Domestic | Single country breakdown for all countriesf12 |
| Single country breakdown for each EEA member | Cross-border within the EEA | ||||
| Rest of the world (cross-border outside the EEA) | Rest of the world (cross-border outside the EEA) | ||||
Annotations
Footnotes
- f1
-
Outstanding value on e-money storages issued by e-money issuers.
- f2
-
Cards issued under each other PCS should be reported separately in the manner required by the NCB.
- f3
-
For cross-border card-based payment transactions, the residency of the counterpart and the location of the POS are reported together. For card-based payment transactions initiated remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. For card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely, sent payment transactions are reported to identify the country of the receiving PSP and the country in which the physical terminal is located. Received payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the point of sale is located. Received payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country of the sending PSP and the country in which the physical point of sale is located
- f4
-
Reported for each scheme separately.
- f5
-
The reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme.
- f6
-
Reported for each scheme separately.
- f7
-
The reason for authentication via non-SCA are not broken down by scheme.
- f8
-
Only reported for the value of fraudulent transactions.
- f9
-
Only reported for the value of fraudulent transactions.
- f10
-
The geographical (Geo) breakdowns are based on the location of the terminal.
- f11
-
Cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated remotely are reported to identify the country in which the point of sale is located, while cross-border card-based payment transactions initiated non-remotely are reported to identify the country in which the physical terminal is located.
- f12
-
Based on ISO 3166:https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#search